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UR REACTION TO THE danger of Soviet totalitarianism is explainable
in large part by the fact that we became aware of the danger so
late and then only after we were victimized by the illusion that the
"Grand Alliance" which won the war would continue on to "win the peace."
Disappointment, frustration and anger mixed with fear and found an outlet
in the measures taken against the adherents of Communism in our midst. But
men devoted to the democratic cause have charged that in adopting these
measures to fight Communist totalitarianism, we are aping the methods of
our foes.' Although the courts have so far upheld the principal measures taken
by Congress to combat Communism at home, they have not allayed the ap-
prehension which has been voiced so bitterly by the dissenting judges claim-
ing to represent the American liberal tradition. The passage of the Communist
Control Act of 19542 affords a fresh opportunity to explore the question-
which should always be in order-whether we have forsaken democratic prin-
ciples in the fight against Communism.
I. ANALYSIS OF THE HISTORY AND PROVISIONS
OF THE COMMUNIST CONTROL ACT
A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
On August 12, 1954, as the Eighty-Third Congress was approaching ad-
journment and its members, anxious to be off for the coming campaign, were
t Professor of Law, The University of Wisconsin. The author wishes to express his appre-
ciation to his colleagues, Professors Willard Hurst, Samuel Mermin and Julius Weinberg
who carefully read and criticized his manuscript.
'Mr. justice Douglas, for example, dissenting in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,
591 (1951), said: "Vishinsky wrote in 1938 in The Law of the Soviet State, 'In our state,
naturally there can be no place for freedom of speech, press, and so on, for the foes of social-
ism.' Our concern should be that we accept no such standard for the United States."
2 68 Stat. 775 (1954), 50 U.S.C.A. § 841 (Supp., 1954).
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wearily debating the Butler bill to combat Communist infiltration of labor
unions,3 Senator Humphrey of Minnesota introduced a substitute amend-
ment to subject to imprisonment for not more than five years and a fine of
$10,000 any person who knowingly and wilfully became or remained a mem-
ber of the Communist Party, with knowledge of its objectives. 4 After voting
85-1 to add the Humphrey amendment to, instead of substituting it for, the
Butler bill,5 and modifying the proposal in certain other respects, the Senate
passed the bill, 85-0.6
In the week that followed, second thoughts assailed both the Senate and
the House and their positions vacillated. Ultimately, Congress rejected the
original Humphrey proposal because of doubts about its constitutionality and
concern that, even if it were upheld, it would force the courts to invalidate
the registration requirements of the Internal Security Act as in violation of
the privilege against self-incrimination accorded by the Fifth Amendment.
Instead, Congress, by overwhelming votes,7 adopted tha Communist Control
Act of 1954 in order "to outlaw the Communist Party."
B. PRovIsIONs
Section 2. Section 2 of the Act sets forth the findings of fact which, in the
judgment of Congress, make the legislation necessary. Congress found that the
Communist Party purports to be a political party but is in fact "the agency
of a hostile foreign power" and "an instrumentality of a conspiracy to over-
throw the Government of the United States" by "any available means, in-
cluding resort to force and violence." Therefore, Congress concluded, the
party's existence presents "a clear present and continuing danger to the se-
curity of the United States" and it "should be outlawed."
Section 3. "Outlawry" is effected by the provision in Section 3 that "what-
ever rights, privileges, and immunities which have heretofore been granted to
said party or any subsidiary organization by reason of the laws of the United
States or any political subdivision thereof, are hereby terminated." Literally,
'The Butler bill, Sen. 3,706, was amended in some respects and incorporated in H§ 6-11
of the Communist Control Act of 1954. These sections, which amend the Subversive Activi-
ties Control Act of 1950, Title I of the Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987 (1950),
50 U.S.C.A. § 781, by adding the category of "Communist-infiltrated organizations" to the
categories "Communist-action organization" and "Communist-front organization," will not
be considered in this paper. For a detailed discussion of these sections and the other pro-
visions of the Act, consult The Communist Control Act of 1954, 64 Yale L. J. 712, 752-65
(1955) ; Federal Anti-Subversive Legislation of 1954, 55 Col. L. Rev. 631, 674-701 (1955).
' 100 Cong. Rec. 14,208 (1954).
5Ibid., at 14,229. Senator Daniel made this successful proposal and it was accepted by
Senator Humphrey and all of his twenty Democratic co-sponsors except Senator Lehman
who cast the only negative vote.
8 Ibid., at 14,234.
7 The conference report was adopted by the House, 265-2, ibid., at 15,237, and by the
Senate, 79-0, ibid., at 15,121.
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this provision can be interpreted to deprive the party of all "rights, privileges,
and immunities" because the "laws of the United States or any political sub-
division thereof" include the common law as well as statute law of the states
and all "rights, privileges, and immunities" are "granted" by such laws since
these terms describe the extent to which particular individual or group claims
or interests are secured by law.
It is clear from the debates that the Act was intended to bar the Commu-
nist Party from appearing on the ballot in any national, state or local elec-
tion. Furthermore, although the language of Section 3 is directed solely at the
party as an organization, it has been construed in Salwen v. Rees8 to preclude
a candidate who was not a nominee of the Communist Party from appearing
on the ballot in a state election under the Communist Party label. The
court emphasized that this disqualification was not directed against the candi-
date personally, but was necessary to effectuate the objectives of the act
with regard to the Party. Salwen v. Rees, therefore, does not foreclose the
questions whether (1) a candidate who is a Communist Party member or an
avowed party adherent must be given a place on the ballot if he foregoes use
of the party label and (2) the votes written in for a party member, or an
avowed party adherent, who has no place on the ballot must be counted.
Unless these questions are answered in the negative, the exclusion of the
Communist Party as such from a place on the ballot may not keep it from
participating in the electoral process as actively as it may choose. Yet the
language of Section 3 makes it very difficult to arrive at negative answers to
these questions.
Beyond revealing the clear intention to keep the party off the ballot, the
legislative history fails to elucidate the scope of Section 3.9 There is a brief
mention that under the act, the party "could not sue" and "could not be
sued."' 0 Senator Ferguson thought the party would not be able to make
leases or enter into any contractual relations, "because the party would have
s 16 N.J. 216, 108 A. 2d 265 (1954). The opinion of Judge Drewer of the Superior Court,
Chancery Division, which was affirmed per curiam by the Supreme Court, does not clarify
the facts of the case. 55 Col. L. Rev., op. cit. supra note 3, at 708 n. 589 states that the
appellant "argued that the [Communist Control] Act did not prevent him from using the
Communist Party label, since he was not nominated by the Communist Party but had filed
a petition containing the requisite number of signatures. Thus, he maintained, the Party as
such would not be appearing on the ballot. Brief for Appellant, pp. 11-12, Salwen v. Rees,
supra!'
' Nor are we aided particularly by the opening sentence of Section 3 which declares that
the Communist Party and successor organizations "are not entitled to any of the rights,
privileges, and immunities attendant upon legal bodies created under the jurisdiction of the
laws of the United States or any political subdivision thereof." Since the Party is an unin-
corporated association, see 64- Yale L. J., op. cit. supra note 3, at 719 n. 43, and not a legal
body "created" under any law, this sentence has value only for purposes of analogy.
" Senator Kefauver, 100 Cong. Rec. 14,713 (1954). Senator Butler agreed, ibid.
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no legal rights within the United States."'" If, however, Section 3 is read to
deprive the party of the right to sue in the courts, whether federal, state or
local, as it literally seems to do, it may produce consequences unintended by
Congress. The party's property, funds, books and records, if located, could
be confiscated by the government and the party would have no recourse. The
party could be denied the use of the mails and of radio and television.
Yet it was not the purpose of Section 3 to effect the dissolution of the Com-
munist Party. Although Section 2 speaks of outlawing the party, Section 3 ap-
parently was not intended to make the party's very existence unlawful. Legis-
lation for this purpose has usually employed unmistakable language. 12 By
contrast, the proviso at the end of Section 3 requires that the section shall not
be construed as amending the Internal Security Act of 1950. In upholding the
order of the Subversive Activities Control Board requiring the Communist
SIbid., at 14,719.
"Outlawry," of course, means to "be put out of the protection of the law" and, his-
torically, involved the forfeiture of the outlaw's goods, as well as the dissolution of every
contract to which he was a party. 1 Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law 477 (2d ed.,
1911). Forfeiture inured to the benefit of the Crown and foreclosed the possibility that pri-
vate individuals might seize the outlaw's property with impunity.
The general language of Sections 2 and 3, read together, is subject to the interpretation
that the declaration of outlawry itself causes the funds, records and other property of the
Party to escheat to the state. But this language should be compared with that of Section 2
of Texas Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., art. 6889-3A (Supp., 1954) which provides that "It shall be
unlawful for [the Communist] Party... to exist, function, or operate in the State of Texas"
and authorizes judicial proceedings to dissolve the Party. The Texas statute further provides
that ".... all funds, records, and other property belonging to such Party.. . shall be seized
by and forfeited to the State of Texas, to escheat to the State as in the case of a person dying
without heirs." Mass. Ann. Laws c. 264 (Supp., 1954) is equally specific. Section 16A de-
clares the Communist Party to be a subversive organization as defined in Section 16 and
Section 17 declares all subversive organizations to be unlawful. Section 18 authorizes judicial
proceedings to enjoin the Party from acting further as a subversive organization and to dis-
solve it as an organization. "Other state laws declare the existence of organizations advo-
cating the violent overthrow of the Government of the United States or of the state illegal,
and provide for the seizure and forfeiture of the organizations' funds, books, and records.
See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. § 14.370 (Supp. 1954)." 64 Yale L. J., op. cit. supra note 3, at 715
n. 28.
As of 1950, thirty nations had "outlawed" the Communist Party. H.R. Rep. No. 2,980,
81st Cong. 2d Sess. 2 (1950). Outlawry of totalitarian organizations abroad has generally
been effected by their dissolution as organizations and confiscation of their properties. For
example, the Communist Party Dissolution Act of 1950 in Australia, 48 Australian Common-
wealth Acts No. 16, declared the Australian Communist Party to be an unlawful association
which, by force of the Act, was dissolved. The Act provided for the vesting of the Party's
property in a receiver to be appointed by the Governor-General. The Act was declared un-
constitutional as not within the powers of the federal government in Australian Communist
Party v. Commonwealth, 83 Commw. L. R. 1 (1951). In accordance with the Basic Law
of the German Federal Republic, the Federal Constitutional Court found that the object
and activities of the neo-Nazi Sozialistische Reichspartei (SRP) were directed against the
constitutional order and its decision eliminated the parliamentary seats held by SRP mem-
bers, confiscated the Party's property and forbade the formation of a substitute organization.
Friedrich and Sutherland, Defense of the Constitutional Order, in Studies in Federalism 703
(Bowie and Friedrich ed., 1954).
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Party to register as a Communist-action organization, the court of appeals in
Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control
Board13 concluded that the Communist Control Act did not in any way affect
the party's obligations under the Internal Security Act. Certainly it would be
inconsistent policy to effect the dissolution of the party as an organization
and at the same time require it to register and file annual reports and subject
it to fine for failure to do so. Furthermore, the information which the Internal
Security Act requires the party to submit with its registration assumes a de-
gree of activity on its part which will be made impossible if the self-enforcing
provisions of Section 3 of the Communist Control Act are given their widest
possible scope. For example, the Internal Security Act assumes that the party
will continue to have offices, officers and members, collect and spend money,
and make and keep records 1 4 and that it will pay income tax.15 Since the
party is required to label the publications it sends through the mails and dis-
close its sponsorship of radio and television broadcasts,'8 it must have been
anticipated that the party might engage in these activities. It would not be
sound, however, to argue that because the regulatory provisions of the In-
ternal Security Act will have no scope if the activities sought to be regulated
are prohibited by the Communist Control Act, the proviso in Section 3 of the
latter act should be interpreted to authorize the party to continue to engage
in these activities. This argument could be stretched to the point where it
would nullify Section 3. But the proviso does indicate, particularly in the
light of the rejection of the original Humphrey proposal, that when faced
with the alternatives of forcing the disclosure of Communist activities and
prohibiting them entirely, Congress chose the former. However, the general
language used in Section 3 indicates that the legislators did not think through
the problems that would arise when the weapon of partial proscription was
added to that of publicity in the fight against Communism.
The construction that will be given Section 3, therefore, is uncertain, be-
yond the barring of the party from the ballot. Obviously, as the court in
CP v. SACB recognized, the Section 3 proviso preserves the party's right,
under Section 14 of the Internal Security Act, to obtain judicial review of the
board's order. Undoubtedly, too, Section 3 will deprive the party of any
"223 F. 2d 531 (App. D.C., 1954), cert. granted, 350 U.S. 859 (1955). This case will be
referred to hereafter as CP v. SACB.
'
4Section 7(d), 64 Stat. 993 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. S 786 (d) (1951). See, too, the regula-
tions prescribed by the Attorney-General pursuant to Section 7(d) to govern the registration
of Communist organizations and their members. 19 Fed. Reg. 6035-36 (1954). These regu-
lations were issued after the Communist Control Act became law. Section 11.204(a) of the
regulations requires the Communist Party to keep "cancelled checks, bank statements and
records of income and disbursements."
' Section 11(b), 64 Stat. 997 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. § 790(b) (1951).
"
5 Section 10, 64 Stat. 996 (1950), 50 U.S.CA. § 789 (1951).
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special "rights, privileges, and immunities," such as the second-class mailing
privilege, 17 granted -by law to encourage particular kinds of activity.18
Section 4. Section 4 displaced the provision in the original Humphrey pro-
posal imposing criminal penalties for party membership. It provides that
whoever "knowingly and wilfully" becomes or remains a member of the Com-
munist Party "with knowledge of the purpose or objective of such organiza-
tion shall be subject to all the provisions and penalties of the Internal Securi-
ty Act of 1950, as amended, as a member of a 'Communist-action' organiza-
tion." 19 If Section 4 of the Communist Control Act has any purpose at all, it
-39 U.S.C.A. §§ 224-34, particularly § 226 (1928).
" In Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946), the Court referred to the second-
class mailing privilege as "a form of subsidy" designed "to encourage the distribution of
periodicals which disseminated 'information of a public character' or which were devoted
to 'literature, the sciences, arts, or some special industry' because it was thought that those
publications as a class contributed to the public good." Ibid., at 151, 154.
" The Internal Security Act requires every "Communist-action" organization to register
with the Attorney-General and to accompany its registration by a statement containing,
inter alia, the names (including aliases) and addresses of its members (Sections 7(a), (c)
and (d) (4), 64 Stat. 992-93 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. § 786 (a), (c) and (d) (4) (1951)). If it fails
to register voluntarily, the Attorney-General may institute proceedings before the Subver-
sive Activities Control Board to compel it to register, Section 13, 64 Stat. 998 (1950), 50
U.S.C.A. § 792 (1951). A Board order requiring an organization to register is subject to
judicial review, Section 14, 64 Stat. 1001 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. § 793 (1951), and the penal-
ties for failure to register do not attach until the Board's order becomes final, Section 15(a),
64 Stat. 1002 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. § 794(a) (1951), which is not until after the process of
judicial review is exhausted, Section 14 (b), 64 Stat. 1002 (1950), 50 U.S.C-A. § 793 (b)
(1951),
The requirement that the individual members of a Communist-action organization regis-
ter is "an alternate, rather than an attachment, to the registration of the organization." CP
v. SACB, 223 F. 2d 531, 551 (App. D.C., 1954). It comes into play only "if an organization
finally ordered to register fails to do so, or if upon registering and filing its membership list
the organization fails to include the member's name." Ibid. See Section 8, 64 Stat. 995 (1950),
50 U.S.C.A. § 787 (1951). If, in such a case, a member of a Communist-action organization
fails to register, the Attorney-General may institute proceedings before the Board to compel
him to do so, but the criminal penalties for failure to register do not attach until the Board's
order finding him to be a member and requiring him to register becomes final, following the
exhaustion of the process of judicial review, Sections 13, 14 and 15(a), 64 Stat. 999-1002
(1950), 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 792, 793 and 794(a) (1951). Furthermore, an individual who denies
that he is a member of a Communist-action organization, in spite of the fact that he has
been listed in a registration statement, may resort to the specified procedure to have his
name stricken from the statement, Section 7(g), 64 Stat. 994 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. § 786 (g)
(1951). But as soon as a Communist-action organization registers or a final order requiring
it to register is in effect, certain sanctions are immediately imposed upon members-they are
prohibited from holding any non-elective office or employment under the United States or
engaging in any employment in any defense facility; and they may not obtain or use a pass-
port, Sections 5(a)(1), 6(a), 64 Stat. 992-93 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 784(a) (1), 785(a)
(1951). Section 6 of the Communist Control Act, 68 Stat. 777 (1954), 50 U.S.C.A. § 784
(Supp., 1954), added the sanction that they may not hold office or employment with any
labor organization or represent any employer in any proceeding under the National Labor
Relations Act. For violation of any of these prohibitions, Section 15 (c), 64 Stat. 1003
(1950), 50 U.S.C.A. § 794 (c) (1951), imposes severe criminal penalties, which originally
were not to apply against a person who was listed in a registration statement as a member
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is to obviate the necessity of proceeding before the Subversive Activities Con-
trol Board to have the Communist Party declared a Communist-action organ-
ization and to preclude judicial review of the question.2 0 Impatient with the
fact that four years had elapsed since the Internal Security Act became law
and no organization or individual was yet registered thereunder, Congress
sought a short cut. But whether it found it in Section 4 is extremely doubtful.
In the first place, Section 4 does not expressly require the Communist Party
to register immediately as a Communist-action organization. Though CP v.
SACB considered the applicability of the Communist Control Act, the opinion
did not even mention the possibility that such a requirement might be in-
ferred. Nor, obviously, did the court think that Section 4 had rendered the
proceedings before the board superfluous or precluded judicial review. In fact,
it reviewed in great detail the evidence upon which the board found the Com-
munist Party to be a Communist-action organization and concluded that
this finding was supported by a preponderance of the evidence, without relying
in any way on the congressional findings in the Communist Control Act.
Secondly, so far as the individual party member is concerned, it is conceiv-
able that Section 4 might be interpreted to require him to register immediately
even if the party itself has not been finally ordered to do so. But the "pro-
visions" of the Internal Security Act do not require him to register unless
the party is finally ordered to register and fails to do so or the party registers
but fails to include his name in the membership list (Section 8) and even
then he is not subject to the penalties of Section 15 (a) unless he himself has
been finally ordered to register (Sections 13, 14 and 15 (a)). It is difficult
to construe the language of Section 4 as short-cutting these "provisions." 21
Nor does it make very much sense to read Section 4 to say that for purposes
of the "provisions" regarding registration of its members, the Communist
Party shall be conclusively presumed to be a Communist-action organization,
but not for purposes of the "provisions" regarding registration of the party
of a Communist-action organization but who requested the Attorney-General to remove his
name from the list, unless and until the Attorney-General denied the request, Sections 5(c)
and 6(c), 64 Stat. 993 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 784(c) and 785(c) (1951) read together with
Sections 7(g) and 9 (b), 64 Stat. 994, 996 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 786(g) and 788(b) (1951).
The latter provisions were repealed by Section 7(c) of the Communist Control Act and "one
who is a member is subject to the sanctions without the interval of immunity." CP v. SACB,
223 F. 2d 531, 553 n. 48 (App. D.C., 1954).
"* See the statement of Senator Humphrey, 100 Cong. Rec. 15,105 (1954); but cf. the
statements of Senator Butler, ibid., at 15,103-4. Congressman Dies thought that Section 4
made membership in the Communist Party a crime in itself, punishable as such. Ibid., at
15,237. This Senator Butler correctly denied. Ibid., at 15,102.
'Senator Butler expressed the view that Section 4 did not require the individual mem-
ber to register immediately but only in accordance with the "provisions" of the Internal
Security Act. 100 Cong. Rec. 15,103 (1954). Senators Cooper and McCarran apparently
thought that Section 4 required individual members to register immediately. Ibid., at 15,113.
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itself. It is not reasonable, too, to interpret Section 4 to mean that the "penal-
ties" provided by Section 15 (c) and the disabilities of Sections 5 and 6 of
the Internal Security Act come into play immediately, even though neither
the Communist Party nor the individual has registered or been ordered finally
to register.2 2 The "provisions" of the Internal Security Act do not impose
these penalties and disabilities unless the organization is registered or there
is in effect a final order requiring it to do so. Furthermore, it would be in-
congruous to say that the Communist Party shall be conclusively presumed to
be a Communist-action organization for purposes of the "provisions" regard-
ing penalties and disabilities but not regarding registration. Both the sugges-
tions rejected could also conceivably lead to the absurd result that party mem-
bers would be required to register or incur penalties and disabilities because
they belonged to an organization which the Supreme Court might eventually
hold not to be a Communist-action organization. In any case, the question of
the possible effect of Section 4 upon the party and its membership will shortly
become academic when CP v. SACB is finally decided. Truly, in this respect,
the mountain was in labor and, after all, brought forth a mouse.
23
' Contrast 64 Yale L. J., op. cit. supra note 3, at 747 which reaches an opposite conclu-
sion on the basis of very flimsy evidence, but prompted by the thought that Section 4 must
be given some meaning that adds to the Internal Security Act. 55 Col. L. Rev., op. cit. supra
note 3, at 716-17 suggests that Section 4 be interpreted to authorize proceedings before the
Subversive Activities Control Board to require individual members of the Party to register
even though the Party has not been finally ordered to register and to impose the disability
and penalty provisions of the Internal Security Act upon members even before they are
ordered to register. This position, as the authors recognize, is not free from the inconsist-
encies pointed out in the text. Ibid., at 715-16 n. 646.
' The fact that Section 4 of the Communist Control Act makes the "provisions and penal-
ties" of the Internal Security Act applicable only to individuals who "knowingly or wilfully"
become or remain members of the Communist Party "with knowledge of the purpose or ob-
jective" of the Party, whereas the Internal Security Act speaks only of "members" does not
mean that Section 4 has weakened the Internal Security Act. In CP v. SACB, Sections 5
and 6 of the Internal Security Act, 64 Stat. 992-93 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 784 and 785
(1951), were interpreted to apply only to members "with knowledge or notice" that the
organization to which they belong is registered or has been finally ordered to register. "If,"
said the court, "the organization has registered as a Communist-action organization without
an order to do so, it has voluntarily agreed that it is such an organization. If a final order
has been entered against it, its nature as such an organization has been determined by full
administrative proceedings fully reviewed by the courts." Therefore, knowledge or notice of
registration or a final order "carries knowledge or notice of the nature of the organization;
its nature has been either admitted or established." CP v. SACB, 223 F. 2d 531, 551 (App.
D.C., 1954). Though the court did not pass on this question, it seems clear that the penal-
ties of Section 15, 64 Stat. 1003 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. S 794 (1951), could not be applied to a
member who did not have such knowledge or notice. Section 4 thus stated what was implicit
in the Internal Security Act as originally passed.
It may be worth mentioning that Section 4 adds something new to the Internal Security
Act. It applies not only to members of the Communist Party but also to members of "any
other organization having for one of its purposes or objectives the establishment, control,
conduct, seizure, or overthrow of the Government of the United States, or the government
of any State or political subdivision thereof, by the use of force or violence." The other
organizations referred to are not possible successors to the Communist Party, because sub-
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Section 5. The most significant contribution of the Communist Control
Act to the Internal Security Act is made by Section 5, which specifies the
kind of evidence which, if presented, shall be considered in determining
membership in the Communist Party.24 Although this section is directed to
"the jury, under instructions from the court," it will no doubt guide the
Subversive Activities Control Board and the courts. The Internal Security
section (b) defines "Communist Party" for the purposes of Section 4 to mean "the organi-
zation now known as the Communist Party... whether or not any change is hereafter made
in the name thereof." (Compare Section 3 which applies to the Communist Party "or any
successors" thereof "regardless of the assumed name"). Yet the members of such another
organization, which may be a Fascist, Nazi or other totalitarian anti-Communist organiza-
tion are subjected to the Internal Security Act as members of a "Communist-action" organi-
zation. It will take a great deal of judicial ingenuity to make sense of this provision and
bring such an organization and its members under the Internal Security Act. It might be
done by construing Section 4 as amending the definition of a "Communist-action organiza-
tion" in Section 3 (3) of the Internal Security Act, 64 Stat. 989'(1950), 50 U.S.C.A. § 782 (3)
(1951), and all the other provisions of that act in a corresponding fashion.
Section 5 provides: "In determining membership or participation in the Communist
Party, or any other organization defined in this Act, or knowledge of the purpose or objec-
tive of such party or organization, the jury, under instructions from the court, shall consider
evidence, if presented, as to whether the accused person:
"(1) Has been listed to his knowledge as a member in any book or any of the lists, records,
correspondence, or any other document of the organization;
"(2) Has made financial contribution to the organization in dues, assessments, loans or
in any other form;
"(3) Has made himself subject to the discipline of the organization in any form whatso-
ever;
"(4) Has executed orders, plans, or directives of any kind of the organization;
"(5) Has acted as an agent, courier, messenger, correspondent, organizer, or in any other
capacity in behalf of the organization;
"(6) Has conferred with officers or other members of the organization in behalf of any
plan or enterprise of the organization;
"(7) Has been accepted to his knowledge as an officer or member of the organization or
as one to be called upon for services by other officers or members of the organization;
"(8) Has written, spoken or in any other way communicated by signal, semaphore, sign,
or in any other form of communication orders, directives, or plans of the organization;
"(9) Has prepared documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books or any other type of publication
in behalf of the objectives and purposes of the organization;
"(10) Has mailed, shipped, circulated, distributed, delivered, or in any other way sent or
delivered to others material or propaganda of any kind in behalf of the organization;
"(11) Has advised, counseled or in any other way imparted information, suggestions,
recommendations to officers or members of the organization or to anyone else in behalf of
the objectives of the organization;
"(12) Has indicated by word, action, conduct, writing or in any other way a willing-
ness to carry out in any manner and to any degree the plans, designs, objectives, or purposes,
of the organization;
"(13) Has in any other way participated in the activities, planning, actions, objectives
or purposes of the organization;
"(14) The enumeration of the above subjects of evidence on membership or participation
in the Communist Party or any other organization as above defined, shall not limit the in-
quiry into and consideration of any other subject of evidence on membership and participa-
tion as herein stated."
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Act did not define membership and Section 5 was intended to anticipate the
difficulty of proving membership when party members no longer carry cards
or other identifying documents and may even formally resign once the party
is finally ordered to register as a Communist-action organization.25 Although
the "subjects of evidence" enumerated include the past as well as the present
activities of an individual, the ultimate finding must be one of present mem-
bership.2 6 And, as the court of appeals said in connection with the evidentiary
considerations which Section 13 (e) of the Internal Security Act requires of
the board in determining whether a group is a Communist-action organiza-
tion: "The ultimate finding is to be derived as a conclusion from basic find-
ings. The Board may find full activities in respect to some of these matters,
partial activities in respect to some, and a complete absence of activity in re-
spect to some. The Board may make findings in other relevant respects not
here enumerated. Having made these several findings, the Board must distil
from the composite an ultimate finding."12 7 Like Section 13 (e), Section 5
does not "specify what quantum or what character of evidence shall produce
a given result."128 For this reason, in determining whether the enumerated evi-
dentiary considerations are relevant to the determination of present member-
ship, they must be taken together and not in isolation.
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE COMMUNIST CONTROL ACT
The main concern of this paper is with the constitutionality of Section 3
of the Act which terminates the "rights, privileges, and immunities" of the
Communist Party. The basic questions concerning the constitutionality of the
Internal Security Act will not be considered.2
9
A. TAE FiRST AmENDMENT: ARE TpmE LIMITING POSTULATES?
Even if Section 3 is construed only to bar the Communist Party itself
from the ballot, it will deny the claims of the party and its members to full
'See the statement of Attorney-General Brownell referred to in 100 Cong. Rec. 15,112
(1954). The non-communist affidavit requirement of the Labor-Management Relations Act,
61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(h) (Supp., 1954), has raised similar problems. See,
e.g., Hupman v. United States, 219 F. 2d 243 (C.A. 6th, 1955).
' Section 4 refers to "whoever... becomes or remains a member." The registration re-
quirements of Section 8 of the Internal Security Act are imposed upon "any individual who
is or becomes a member" and Section 13(b) gives an individual registered under Section 8
an opportunity to institute proceedings for the cancellation of his registration. It must,
therefore, have been contemplated that an individual who was once a member could cease
to be so and be relieved of the burdens of the Act.
' CP v. SACB, 223 F. 2d 531, 559 (App. D.C., 1954).
='Ibid., at 560. Congressman Dies expressed the view that Section 5 made proof of any
one of the enumerated factual situations proof of membership. 100 Cong. Rec. 15,237 (1954).
This interpretation is clearly erroneous.
I On these questions, see Sutherland, Freedom and Internal Security,, 64 Harv. L. Rev,
383 (1951) and Meltzer, Required Records, The McCarran Act, and the Privilege against
Self-Incrimination, 18 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 687 (1951).
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freedom of political organization and expression and raise questions under
the First Amendment. These questions will come into sharper focus if Sec-
tion 3 is read so as to effect the dissolution of the Communist Party as a
legal organization. The discussion that follows is intended to apply even if
the latter possibility materializes.
Evaluation of Section 2 Findings. Any approach to the problem of consti-
tutionality will be determined by the underlying evaluation of the Commu-
nist movement and particularly by the acceptance or rejection of the findings
in Section 2. To fortify the Act against attack under the First Amendment,8 0
Congress found that the Communist Party purports to be a political party but
is in fact "an instrumentality of a conspiracy to overthrow the Government
of the United States" directed by a hostile foreign power. Whether we choose
to call the Communist Party a "political party" is a matter of definition,31
but that it differs, in the respects enumerated in Section 2, from all other
parties which accept the framework of democracy is, as Senator Humphrey
said, a statement based "upon observation of the facts of life, both at home
and abroad."'8 2 The respects in which it differs, furthermore, are material to
the ends which the Act seeks to serve and the means it employs.
The Communist Party of the United States is the American section of the
world communist movement. Its policies and programs "are secretly prescribed
for it by the foreign leaders" of that movement (Section 2). Its members
"are recruited for indoctrination with respect to its objectives and methods,
and are organized, instructed and disciplined to carry into action slavishly
the assignments given them by their hierarchical chieftains" (ibid.). Its aim
is to further the interests of the world communist movement by any means,
including resort to force and violence, and at whatever costs to the people
of the United States.83 Should it come to power, it would crush the liberties
N "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or of
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress
of grievances."
I "The term 'party' is applied equally to the peaceful parties of America and to the Com-
munist Party of Russia, the Nazi Party of Germany and the Fascist Party of Italy. The
methodology of these parties varies, but their fundamental objective-to place and keep
their leaders in the control of government-is the same." Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure
Groups 246-47 (1942). "Party may be defined as an organized group that seeks to control
both the personnel and the policy of the government." Sait, American Parties and Elections
141 (1927).
32100 Cong. Rec. 14,208 (1954).
* It has often been argued that "domestic" Communism is not a danger. See, for example,
the statement of Professor Chafee, Hearings before the Subcommittee on S. 1,194 and S.
1,196 of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong. 1st Sess. 241-42 (1949) ; dissent-
ing opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 588-89. But, as
Professor Hook has pointed out, although the dangers of Communism "may be distin-
guished in their internal and external aspects.... [tihere is no such thing as merely domestic
Communism. Communism is an international movement whose capital is Moscow; it is
this movement that is the enemy of American democracy; and the American Communist
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of the people in the process of establishing a totalitarian state.3 4 Yet the
party makes every effort to appear like an ordinary "leftist" party in the
great tradition of American dissent. The preamble to its constitution, adopted
in 1948, states that "[t]he Communist Party upholds the achievements of
American democracy and defends the United States Constitution and its
Bill of Rights against its reactionary enemies who would destroy democracy
and popular liberties."3 5 "Propaganda," Hannah Arendt tells us, "is one and
possibly the most important instrument of totalitarianism for dealing with
the nontotalitarian world; terror, on the contrary, is the very essence of its
form of government."3 6
party, no matter what its size or influence (which is not inconsiderable), forms an integral
part of that movement. Without its organic tie to the Soviet state apparatus with all its
machinery for war, espionage, and terror, the American Communist Party would have only
nuisance value, its members would be ineffectual, candidates for the political mental ward
now inhabited by Communist splinter groups like the Trotskyists. It is not the words uttered
by members of the Communist party that make them dangerous, but their organizational
ties; these make them the paramilitary fifth column of a powerful state, obligated to strike
whenever their foreign masters give the word." Hook, Does the Smith Act Threaten Our
Liberties? 15 Commentary 63, 68 (1953).
See, too, Burns v. Ransley, 79 Commw. L. R. 101 (1949) in which a representative of the
Australian Communist Party, replying to the following question, "We all realize the world
could become embroiled in a third world war in the immediate future between Soviet Russia
and the Western Powers. In the event of such a war what would be the attitude and actions
of the Communist Party in Australia?," said: "If Australia was involved in such a war, it
would be between Soviet Russia and American and British Imperialism. It would be a
counter-revolutionary war. We would oppose that war. It would be a reactionary war."
Pressed for a "direct answer," Burns added: "We would oppose that war. We would fight
on the side of Soviet Russia. That is a direct answer." The High Court of Australia upheld
Burns' summary conviction for uttering seditious words.
"This, it seems to me, is the meaning of the finding in Section 2 that the Communist
Party "constitutes an authoritarian dictatorship within a republic, demanding for itself the
rights and privileges accorded to political parties, but denying to all others the liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution." Essentially the same finding was made by Congress in
Section 2(2) of the Internal Security Act: "The establishment of a totalitarian dictator-
ship in any country results in the suppression of all opposition to the party in power, the
subordination of the rights of individuals to the state, the denial of fundamental rights and
liberties which are characteristic of a representative form of government, such as freedom
of speech, of the press, of assembly, and of religious worship, and results in the maintenance
of control over the people through fear, terrorism, and brutality." See too, Mr. Justice
Jackson's incisive analysis of the alms and methods of the Communist Party in American
Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 424-33 (1950).
Quoted in CP v. SACB, 223 F. 2d 531, 571 (1954).
'Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 335 (1951). (This profound and moving work
is indispensable for an understanding of modern totalitarianism.) Similarly, judge Learned
Hand concluded that the "violent capture" of all existing governments was an article of the
Communist faith "which is a common-place among initiates," but "a part of the homiletics
for novitiates, although so far as conveniently it can be, it is covered by an innocent termi-
nology, designed to prevent its disclosure." United States v. Dennis, 183 F. 2d 201, 212
(CA. 2d, 1950).
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Nevertheless, Section 2 tends to oversimplify the problem presented by the
Communist Party. It is foolhardy to regard it simply as a political party
and overlook its conspiratorial nature. But it is not merely an illegal con-
spiracy masquerading as a political party. It is an organized section of a
world movement struggling for political power by both legal and illegal, open
and conspiratorial means. Its "open" and "legal" methods are those used by
all other political parties, yet they are intertwined with its secret and illegal
methods. For experience has shown that the conspiratorial center orders the
"line" which the "open" activities should take. And the legal activities cover
the conspiratorial center and serve as a recruiting ground for illegal opera-
tions. 87 It is this combination of legality and illegality which makes for the
peculiar difficulties a democracy faces in dealing with the party-difficulties
which are compounded by the organizational ties of the party to a world
movement.
Constitutionality in the Light of the Dennis Case. In many ways, it is
easier to uphold Section 3 of the Communist Control Act against attack
under the First Amendment than the convictions in Dennis v. United States.38
The eleven top Communist leaders were convicted of conspiring to organize
the Communist Party as a society, group and assembly of persons who teach
and advocate the duty and necessity of action to overthrow the United States
government by force and violence, employing language reasonably and or-
dinarily calculated to incite persons to such action and with the specific intent
of accomplishing their purpose at the earliest time that circumstances would
permit. While speech was the basis of the conviction in the Dennis case,
Section 3 is aimed directly against the organization created to effectuate
Communist aims. Also, as Dean Rostow has pointed out, judicial notice had
to be relied upon by the Court to supply the facts and judgments upon which
constitutionality was rested in the Dennis case, because there were no legisla-
tive determinations that the organized promulgation of Communist doctrine
threatened the security of the state at the time of trial or "on the probability
and gravity of the evil sought to be suppressed and on the 'necessity' of re-
s' The Report of the Australian Royal Commission on Espionage on the Petrov case, like
the Report of the Canadian Royal Commission on Soviet Espionage (1946), concluded
that "the evidence clearly shows that it was only among Communists (in which term we
include Communist sympathizers) that the M.V.D. could expect to find in Australia willing
helpers. The only Australians who so far as the evidence shows knowingly assisted Soviet
espionage directly or indirectly were Communists." New York Times, p. 14, col. 7 (Sept.
15, 1955).
Totalitarian movements have been aptly called "secret societies established in broad day-
light." Koyr6, The Political Function of the Modern Lie, Contemporary Jewish Record
(June 1945), quoted by Arendt, op. cit. supra note 36, at 363. Totalitarian parties "are a
development, historically and psychologically, not of the political party, but of the secret
society." Russell, Power 177 (1938).
- 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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stricting speech in order to prevent it." 3 9 But Section 3 is supported by the
congressional finding that the Communist Party "should be outlawed" be-
cause "its existence" is a "clear, present and continuing danger to the security
of the United States.1 40 Finally, the courts in the Dennis case were troubled
by the fact that the Smith Act was worded so generally that it could reach
many situations to which its application would be unconstitutional. To pre-
vent this possibility, the scope of the Smith Act was limited by interpretation.
Directed specifically at the Communist Party, Section 3 escapes this diffi-
culty.4'
But the matter should not rest with an analysis of the constitutionality of
Section 3 in the light of the "dear and present danger" test as evolved and
applied in the Dennis case. No issue of this importance is ever settled and a
new problem provides an opportunity for reconsideration of premises. It will
be submitted that the "dear and present danger" doctrine, whether as enunci-
ated by Holmes or Brandeis or Hand, is an unsatisfactory test to determine
the limits which the First Amendment imposes upon congressional action
designed to meet the threat of modern totalitarianism. Instead, it will be
argued that no principle of the Constitution or of democracy requires that a
political movement be permitted to engage in the struggle for power if its
objective is to crush democracy itself.
Assumptions Underlying the First Amendment-Movements Seeking To
Crush Freedom Need Not Be Tolerated. Clear thinking about the First
Amendment will heed Mr. Chief Justice Hughes' admonition that behind "the
words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and con-
trol."42 In the opinion of Judge Learned Hand, the First Amendment "rests
upon a skepticism as to all political orthodoxy, upon a belief that there
are no impregnable political absolutes, and that a flux of tentative doctrines
is preferable to any authoritative creed." 43 This skepticism and belief are
I Rostow, The Democratic Character of judicial Review, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 216-17
(1952).
'It is also arguable that the facts may support more readily a finding that the Com-
munist Party is a clear and present danger to the security of the United States than that
there was a dear and present danger of an attempted overthrow of the United States gov-
ernment by force and violence, which was the finding made in the Dennis case.
Though it was argued in the Dennis case that the Smith Act was too vague and general,
undoubtedly it will be argued that the Communist Control Act is too specific. This question
will be considered at a later point.
' Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934). The historic anteced-
ents of the First Amendment, as Mr. justice Frankfurter has shown, also "preclude the
notion that its purpose was to give unqualified immunity to every expression that touched
on matters within the range of political interest." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 521
(1951). Mr. justice Frankfurter points out, for example, that Jefferson, in opposing the
Sedition Act, argued that the First Amendment reflected a limitation upon federal power,
leaving the right to enforce restrictions on speech to the states.
' United States v. Dennis, 183 F. 2d 201, 207 (C.A. 2d, 1950).
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also reflected in John Stuart Mill's defense of freedom of thought and expres-
sion in On Liberty. "We can never be sure," says Mill, "that the opinion we
are endeavoring to stifle is a false opinion .... Complete liberty of contra-
dicting and disproving our opinion, is the very condition which justifies us
in assuming its truth for purposes of action;" however true a particular
opinion may be, "if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it will
be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth," because "conflict with the op-
posite error is essential to a clear apprehension and deep feeling of its truth."
"[T]hough the silenced opinion be an error," Mill adds, "it may, and very
commonly does, contain a portion of truth; and since the general or pre-
vailing opinion on any object is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by
collision of adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance
of being supplied." 44
To justify freedom of speech, however, it is not necessary to agree with Mr.
justice Holmes that "the theory of our Constitution" is that "the best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market." 45 This view, which may at times also have been voiced by Mill,
has the dangerous tendency to define truth in terms of what the market-place
comes to accept.46 Nor is it necessary to accept "the idealist view that what
is true will survive,"147 because experience may refute this assumption. Yet
the argument for the "clear and present danger" rule as elaborated by Holmes
and Brandeis is based essentially on this pragmatist or idealist conception of
truth and often the two merge since the idealist view will always be confirmed
if the pragmatist definition of truth is accepted. While freedom to criticize
"Mill, On Liberty, in 25 Harvard Classics 219, 222, 238, 249, 256.
"Dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919).
"Mr. Max Lerner has pointed out this weakness in Holmes' pragmatic view which has
been termed the "survival" theory of truth--"the position that the idea which survives in
the struggle of ideas is therefore the true one." Lerner, The Mind and Faith of Justice
Holmes 290 (Modem Library ed., 1954). Lerer comments: "This is a dangerous position
in a time when the manipulation of symbols has become as highly organized as under the
Nazi regime, and in the working of Nazi propaganda outside of Germany." Ibid. For present
purposes, I would substitute "Communist" for "Nazi" and "Soviet Union" for "Germany."
"' Lerner thinks that this view, too, is implicit in some of Holmes' writings. Ibid. It is
explicit, as he points out, in Milton: "And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to
play upon the earth, so truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting
to misdoubt her strength. Let her and falsehood grapple; who ever knew truth put to the
worse, in a free and open encounter?" Areopagitica, in The Portable Milton 199 (1949). It
is the basis also of the famous quotation from Jefferson's First Inaugural in 1801: "If there
be any among us who wish to dissolve this Union, or to change its republican form, let them
stand undisturbed, as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tol-
erated where reason is left free to combat it." Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the
United States, H.R. Doc. No. 540, 82d Cong. 2d Sess. 12 (1952). See, too, the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in the Dennis case, 341 U.S. 494, 584 (1951). ("When ideas
compete in the market for acceptance, full and free discussion exposes the false and they
gain few adherents.")
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may not guarantee the survival or victory of truth, it is sufficient to justify
the First Amendment that it offers the only possibility of correcting error by
the peaceful means of appeal to the reason of man. We may agree also with
Professor Stone that in democratic countries the claims to free opinion and
expression should "approach nearer absoluteness than perhaps any other
single claim" because "they are a vital prerequisite to the formulation and
expression of human demands concerning the exercise of political authority.
Indeed, insofar as we recognize that the function of law in a free community
is the satisfaction of human demands for the time being, it is proper to point
out that this function must be frustrated insofar as freedom of speech is not
permitted to articulate these demands." 48
Mill's classic argument, the eloquent statement of Judge Learned Hand and
Professor Stone's formulation must all assume, it seems to me, one "impreg-
nable" absolute-freedom itself. For if the theory that there are no political
orthodoxies is taken to mean that we must also be skeptical about the value of
freedom and therefore tolerate freedom's enemies, it will tend to produce, in
practice, the very absolutism it was designed to avoid-as experience with
modern totalitarianism demonstrates. When, therefore, Mill says that "we can
never be sure that the opinion we are endeavoring to stifle is a false opinion,"
he could not consistently have been referring to the opinion that freedom of
opinion itself should be suppressed.49 There is a passage in On Liberty which,
I think, supports this inference and has significance for our contemporary
problem. Asking whether the law should enforce an agreement under which
an individual sells himself, voluntarily, as a slave, Mill says no and argues:
"The reason for not interfering, unless for the sake of others, with a person's
voluntary acts, is consideration for his liberty.... But by selling himself for
a slave, he abdicates his liberty; he foregoes any future use of it, beyond that
single act. He therefore defeats, in his own case, the very purpose which is the
justification of allowing him to dispose of himself.... The principle of free-
dom cannot require that he should be free not to be free. It is not freedom, to
be allowed to alienate his freedom." 5"
So, in suppressing totalitarian movements a democratic society is not acting
to protect the status quo, but the very same interests which freedom of speech
itself seeks to secure-the possibility of peaceful progress under freedom. That
suppression may sometimes have to be the means of securing and enlarging
freedom is a paradox which is not unknown in other areas of the law of modern
'Stone, The Province and Function of Law 520-21 (1950).
" Nor does Mill's admonition that however true a particular opinion may be, "if it is not
fully, frequently and fearlessly discussed, it will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth,"
require toleration for the view that freedom of opinion should be suppressed. The value of
freedom of speech and opinion will constantly prove itself as it is practiced to criticize the
status quo in all fields of human thought and endeavor.
I° Mill, op. cit. supra note 44, at 311-12.
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democratic states. The basic "postulate," therefore, which should "limit and
control" the First Amendment is that it is part of the framework for a con-
stitutional democracy and should, therefore, not be used to curb the power
of Congress to exclude from the political struggle those groups which, if vic-
torious, would crush democracy and impose totalitarianism. Whether in any
particular case and at any particular time, Congress should suppress a totali-
tarian movement should be regarded as a matter of wisdom for its sole de-
termination. But a democracy should claim the moral and constitutional right
to suppress these movements whenever it deems it advisable to do so.51
Objections to Position Taken. Does It Propose a Workable Criterion?
Though Professor Riesman sees merit in the view that we should not tolerate
the intolerant, because he thinks it implies that "its expounders have aban-
doned the unproven hope that their example of noninterference will convert
the foes of civil liberties" in favor of the determination that "civil liberties
constitute an active cause, deserving of protection against its enemies like any
other and not above the battle," he rejects it because of "several ethical ob-
jections and insurmountable administrative difficulties." 52 Riesman objects
that the suggested limit of tolerance is unworkable because of the difficulties
of proving the true intentions and principles of totalitarian groups, like the
Communists, who profess their affection for civil liberties and other demo-
cratic procedures. 53 But surely the difficulties of evaluating the historical
forms of Fascist and Communist totalitarianism with which modern democra-
cies have to cope are not insurmountable. Successive waves of events since the
Bolshevik revolution should have removed all reasonable doubts about the
true significance and intentions of the world communist movement. Further-
more, as will be suggested, the determination of fact underlying the decision
to proscribe a particular group, namely, that its objectives are totalitarian,
should be reviewed by the Supreme Court in passing upon the constitutional-
ity of the attempted proscription. This will not make the problem of proof less
difficult, but will provide additional assurance that action will not be taken
without proof.
In fact, Riesman concedes that if the totalitarians presented the only prob-
lem in the application of the suggested test, it "might somehow be manage-
able."54 But, he argues, "many, if not most, American groups, as they admit
or as can be inferred from their behavior or ultimate beliefs, would if they
" See I Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies 265 n. 4 (2d ed., 1952) on the so-called
"paradox of tolerance." As will become apparent, I am greatly indebted to Professor Pop-
per's work and share his views about the implications of democracy.
'Riesman, Civil Liberties in a Period of Transition, in Public Policy 33, 52 (1942).
Though the parts of this article which I shall consider are those with which I do not in the
main agree, my indebtedness to Riesman is great and I agree with his principal thesis.
Ibid., at 55.
Ibid., at 56.
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could deny certain civil liberties to some of their political opponents ...
[Where] reactionary Catholics are in control, they seek to deny freedom of
expression to 'Reds' (as defined by them), to atheists, to advocates of non-
rhythmic birth control. Protestant fundamentalists have sought to silence
evolutionists, and some from the same background would silence Catholics or
Jews, and of course Negroes. Business groups, such as the National Association
of Manufacturers, veterans' organizations, the Hearst opinion empire, have
sought to curb civil liberties for critics of capitalism, as well as for critics of
'democracy' (as defined by them). The list is as endless as it is familiar."5'
But the position which Riesman here rejects is not that taken in this paper.
It is not proposed that as a matter of public policy the government undertake
to ferret out and suppress every intolerant group in the United States which
would, if it could, deny civil liberties to some other group. This policy may
be unwise and unworkable. But the "reactionary Catholics," "Protestant fun-
damentalists," "Business groups," and "Veterans' organizations" of which
Riesman speaks are not engaged in the struggle for political power as such.
To the extent that they may exert pressure for the use of political power to en-
force their intolerant private views, they can and should be resisted. But it
is the "universality, or generality of the design" 56 of totalitarian movements
seeking political power which makes them dangerous enough to warrant sup-
pression.
Is It Consistent with Democratic Principles? The Paradox of Freedom.
Riesman's "ethical objections" remain. He argues, first, that "any judgment
that these radical groups [Fascist, Nazi and Communist] should be denied
the right to urge their case-a case which includes as one of its features the
denial of certain civil liberties to certain opponents-is in fact a concealed
judgment concerning the worth of the total aims of these groups."57 I do not
agree, though I confess to regarding modern totalitarianism as an "absolute
evil." s58 Even if the professed social aims of the totalitarians are regarded as
desirable and it is thought possible to achieve them in a totalitarian state,
there is implicit in the democratic creed "the conviction that the acceptance
of even a bad policy in a democracy (as long as we can work for a peaceful
change) is preferable to the submission to a'tyranny, however wise or be-
- Ibid., at 56-57.
T Livingston, Circuit justice, in United States v. Hoxie, 26 Fed. Cas. 397, 401, No. 15,
407 (C.C., D.Vt., 1808). The judicial limitations of the scope of "constructive" treason by
levying war is analogous to the suggested limitation of the principle that we should not
tolerate the intolerant. See Hurst, Treason in theUnited States, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 226, 398,
806 (1944-45), particularly at 411, 418,.428, 442, 808, 814, 818--25.
1 Riesman,blp. at. supri note'52, at 54.
I See Arendt, op. cit. supra note 36, at 429-39, particularly at 433.
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nevolent." 59 And this conviction may be the basis of the judgment to suppress
totalitarian movements. In other words, because the democratic method of
settling conflict keeps open the avenue of change so that wrongs may be
righted peacefully, the citizens of a democracy have a greater stake in this
method of settlement than in any particular outcome of any particular con-
flict. No group in our society, therefore, is justified in working for the destruc-
tion of democracy in order to achieve any particular ends, however merito-
rious they may, at the moment, seem to be.
Secondly, Riesman argues that "the denial of freedom of expression to those
who disbelieve in it is inconsistent with orthodox, although perhaps errone-
ous, conceptions of the democratic theory. Under that theory, a majority is
entitled to abandon traditional civil liberties if it follows the constitutional
forms. Democrats for whom democracy means majority rule must therefore
logically insist that this putative anti-civil-liberty majority should have the
opportunity of hearing evidence that it would be better off in the absence
of, say, freedom of speech and press." 60 It must be admitted that this "ortho-
dox" conception of democratic theory underlies existing legislation against
the totalitarian threat, 61 as well as the judicial approach to questions of the
constitutionality of this legislation. Without exception, the courts seem to
have assumed that the Communists have a "right," which the courts will pro-
tect, to pursue their aims by peaceful, "constitutional" means. For example,
in his dissenting opinion in Gitlow v. New York, 62 Mr. Justice Holmes said:
"If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are des-
tined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only mean-
ing of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their
'Popper, op. cit. supra note 51, at 125. Bertrand Russell quotes Democritus as having
said: "Poverty in a democracy is as much to be preferred to what is called prosperity under
despots as freedom is to slavery." The History of Western Philosophy 92 n. 1 (1946).
Riesman, op. cit. supra note 52, at 54.
The seditious conspiracy statute, 62 Stat. 808 (1948), 18 U.S.C.A. § 2384 (1951), makes
it a crime to conspire "to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of
the United States." The Smith Act is directed at the teaching or advocacy of the duty or
necessity of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or
violence. 62 Stat. 808, 811 (1948), 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2385, 2381 (1951). The Voorhis Act of
1940, 62 Stat. 808 (1948), 18 U.S.C.A. § 2386 (1951) requires any organization aiming at
the forcible overthrow of the government to register with the Attorney-General. Section
4(a) of the Internal Security Act, 64 Stat. 991 (1950), 50 U.S.CA.. § 783 (1951), which is
directed at the establishment of a totalitarian dictatorship in the United States, specifically
provides that it shall not apply "to the proposal of a constitutional amendment." The find-
ings of fact in Section 2 of the Communist Control Act, 68 Stat. 775 (1954), 50 U.S.C.A.
§ 841 (Supp., 1954), also stress the unlawful means which the Communist movement is
prepared to employ, but recognize, as do even more explicitly the findings in Section 2 of
the Internal Security Act, that the Communist Party "constitutes an authoritarian dictator-
ship within a republic, demanding for itself the rights and privileges accorded to political
parties, but denying to all others the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution."
- 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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way."63 Even Mr. Justice Jackson, in an opinion which showed an acute
awareness of the aims of the Communist movement, thought it important to
point out that "if they [the American Communists] can persuade enough
citizens, they may not only name new officials and inaugurate new policies,
but, by amendment of the Constitution, they can abolish the Bill of Rights and
set up an absolute government by legal methods." 64 Judge Learned Hand was
equally explicit in the Dennis case. In his opinion, the First Amendment
"protects all utterances, individual or concerted, seeking constitutional
changes, however revolutionary, by the processes which the Constitution pro-
vides. Any amendment to the Constitution passed in conformity with Article
V is as valid as though it had been originally incorporated in it; the only ex-
ception being that no state, [without its consent] shall be denied 'its equal
suffrage in the Senate.' "65
But any theory which equates democracy with majority rule is self-contra-
dictory, as Professor Popper has conclusively shown. He tells us that Plato,
by asking "What if it is the will of the people that they should not rule, but a
tyrant instead?," was the first to pose this paradox of freedom. 66 The "ortho-
dox" answer to this question, as we have seen, is that the people, that is, the
majority of them, shall have their way. But then, Professor Popper replies,
the principle of majority rule requires its adherents to oppose the new tyranny
willed by the majority. 67 If any totalitarian party, using legal means, came to
power in the manner prescribed by the Constitution and succeeded by consti-
tutional amendment to inaugurate a totalitarian state, all partisans of democ-
racy would have the moral right, recognized by the Declaration of Independ-
ence,68 to use force and violence, if necessary, to overthrow the tyranny. Cer-
Ibid at 673.
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 429 (1950).
'183 F. 2d 201, 206 (CA. 2d, 1950).
Popper, op. cit. supra note 51, at 123.
6 Ibid.
' The "right of revolution" is usually based on the sentence in the Declaration beginning,
"That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right
of the People to alter or to abolish it.... ." But Professor Hook, op. cit. supra note 33, at 63,
has called attention in this context to the next two sentences: "Prudence, indeed, will dictate
that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and
accordingly all experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while
evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are
accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same
Object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their
duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security."
These sentences support Mr. Chief justice Vinson's statement in the Dennis case, 341 U.S.
494, 501 (1951), that "whatever theoretical merit there may be to the argument that there
is a 'right' to rebellion against dictatorial governments is without force where the existing
structure of the government provides for peaceful and orderly change." The "right to re-
bellion" in any case can only be a moral claim, never a legal right, because obviously no
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tainly then, it is inconsistent to maintain that the Constitution protects a
totalitarian movement on its road to power, so long as it employs constitu-
tional means, but once it comes to power, it becomes the moral right and duty
of the people "to throw off such government." By then, too, an attempt to do
so may be without hope of success. We can avoid these difficulties only by
recognizing that democracy is not merely majority rule, but also embodies the
principle of freedom and that, to paraphrase Mill, the principle of freedom
cannot require that the people, or a majority of them, should be free to alien-
ate its freedom. The principle of freedom requires that democratic policy be
directed "to create, develop, and protect political institutions for the avoidance
of tyranny," 69 which Professor Popper defines as a government "which the
ruled cannot get rid of except by way of a successful revolution-that is to
say, in most cases, not at all."'70 We should regard as a "democracy," there-
fore, not any government which is the product of the will of a majority, but
only that government "which we can get rid of without bloodshed-for exam-
ple, by way of general elections." 71
Professor Hurst has suggested to me that it may be argued that the historic
fact of the defeat of Calhoun's theory of the concurrent majority72 is addi-
tional proof that American constitutional tradition assumes the orthodox
theory of democracy. I have admitted that the orthodox theory is official doc-
trine; to persuade that it should not be is the burden of this paper. Neverthe-
less, it is doubtful whether the argument for the orthodox theory is supported
by the historic rejection of Calhoun's theory. In the first place, Calhoun
state can secure this claim. As Judge Learned Hand has said, "The advocacy of violence
may, or may not, fail; but in neither case can there be any 'right' to use it. Revolutions are
often 'right,' but a 'right of revolution' is a contradiction in terms, for a society which
acknowledged it, could not stop at tolerating conspiracies to overthrow it, but must include
their execution." 183 F. 2d 201, 213 (C.A. 2d, 1950). Even the moral claim to use force
and violence to overthrow a tyranny is justified only if the action has as its exclusive aim
the re-establishment of democratic institutions. The "use of violence is justified only under
a tyranny which makes reforms without violence impossible and it should have only one
aim, that is, to bring about a state of affairs which makes reforms without violence possible."
II Popper, op. cit. supra note 51, at 151.
I Popper, op. cit. supra note 51, at 125.
70 Ibid., at 124.
" Ibid., at 125. Bertrand Russell also defines democratic government "as a method of
settling internal disputes without violence." The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism 98 (2d
ed., 1949). Professor Riesman regards the "orthodox" conception of democracy as "perhaps
erroneous" and admits it is plausible to argue that "one majority should have no right to
preclude future majorities from reopening the issue and arriving at a different conclusion,
and therefore no right-although all else is open to them-to tamper with the procedures
of free opinion formation and electioneering which permit a present minority to become a
future majority." Op. cit. supra note 52, at 54.
'7 Consult Calhoun, Disquisition on Government, in Calhoun, Basic Documents (Ander-
son ed., 1952).
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himself did not use his theory of the concurrent majority to justify the demo-
cratic order and the right of suffrage upon which it is based. He regarded this
right as "the indispensable and primary principle in the foundation of a con-
stitutional government"73 because it was the only way to effect a system of gov-
ernment "by which resistance may be systematically and peaceably made on
the part of the ruled, to oppression and abuse of power on the part of the
rulers."7 4 On this point, the views of Popper and Bertrand Russell are in-
distinguishable from those of Calhoun. However, Calhoun did not think the
right of suffrage, of itself, "sufficient to form constitutional governments." 75
It had to be implemented by a principle "calculated to prevent any one in-
terest, or combination of interests, from using the powers of government to
aggrandize itself at the expense of the others."7 6 Only the principle of the
concurrent majority could accomplish this objective by giving "to each divi-
sion or interest, through its appropriate organ, either a concurrent voice in
making and executing the laws, or a veto on their execution."77 The fires of
the Civil War consumed Calhoun's theory insofar as it was intended to sup-
port a particular view of the desirable basis for American federalism and,
generally, to slow the process of social change. Calhoun placed his theory at
the service of the institution of slavery, not the principle of freedom. But his
more general concern that the existing constitutional checks and balances may
be inadequate to prevent any one interest or combination of interests from
dominating American society is still our concern. The development of centers
of "countervailing power"78 in our society has tended, so far, to avoid this
domination. In any case, the rejection of Calhoun's theory of the concurrent
majority does not reasonably imply acceptance of the view that a majority
has the legal and moral right to decide to dispense with constitutional govern-
ment altogether.
The rejection of the "orthodox" theory of democracy necessarily implies
that one type of constitutional change in the constitutional system is ex-
cluded--"a change which would endanger its democratic character." 79 This,
it is submitted, is the basic postulate which should control, not only the inter-
pretation of the First Amendment, but also the amendment article (Art. V)"
of the Constitution. No one will maintain that the establishment of a totali-
tarian dictatorship in the United States by a constitutional amendment would
not upset the basic scheme of things embodied in the Constitution as much
as an amendment depriving certain states without their consent of their equal
Ibid., at 37.
' Tbid., at 36. h Ibid., at 44.
Ibid. Ibid., at 44-45.
Consult Galbraith, American Capitalism (1952).
II Popper, op. cit. supra note 51, at 161.
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representation in the Senate-which Article V expressly prohibits.80 No demo-
cratic or constitutional principle is violated, therefore, when a democracy
acts to exclude those groups from entering the struggle for political power
which, if victorious, will not permit that struggle to continue in accordance
with the democratic way.8 '
This view makes it irrelevant, for purposes of constitutional adjudication,
whether a particular group is committed to the use of illegal means in the
struggle for political power and will help to dissipate confusion resulting from
the application of the clear and present danger rule to legislation forbidding
the advocacy of the violent overthrow of the government. This conclusion is
not based upon Riesman's view that such legislation "must fail of ethical justi-
fication, because it should never be assumed as a matter of course that a par-
ticular government deserves to stand, even if violence or the urging of violence
is the only method by which, for all practical purposes, it can be over-
thrown."8 2 The exercise of the Jeffersonian "right of revolution," upon which
Riesman relies, has moral justification, as I have indicated, only if the govern-
ment in power is a tyranny which closes all avenues of peaceful change and
then only if the restoration of democracy is the sole objective.83 Furthermore,
Consult Corwin, The Constitution and What It Means Today 175 (11th ed., 1954):
"Of the two exceptions to the amending power the first is today obsolete. This does not
signify, however, that the only change that the power which amends the Constitution may
not make in the Constitution is to deprive a state without its consent of its 'equal suffrage
in the Senate.' The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in
form a delegated, and hence, a limited power, although this does not imply necessarily that
the Supreme Court is vested with authority to determine its limits. The one power known
to the Constitution which dearly is not limited by it is that which ordains it-in other
words, the original, inalienable power of the people of the United States to determine their
own political institutions." If I read Professor Corwin correctly, I infer that he would
agree that even a majority of the people of the United States (and the people in the 36 rati-
fying states may constitute less than a majority) would have no constitutional right to
exercise their power to determine their own political institutions so as to yield it to a totali-
tarian dictatorship, because this power is "original" and "inalienable."
1 A democracy would thus have the right to suppress totalitarian movements whether
they were committed to use (1) illegal means to come to power in a manner not prescribed
by the existing constitution; or (2) illegal means (e.g., the terrorization of voters) to come
to power in a manner prescribed by the existing constitution; or (3) legal means to come
to power in a manner prescribed by the existing constitution, but once in power to use
illegal means to overthrow the existing democratic order; or (4) legal means to come to
power in a manner prescribed by the existing constitution and once in power, to use legal
means (e.g., constitutional amendment) to'inaugurate a totalitarian state. Cf. Friedrich and
Sutherland, op. cit. supra note 12, at 682 n. 10. While the authors here define "subversion"
merely "as a course of action designed mediately or immediately to change an established
constitutional order by unconstitutional means," they recognize that the "development of
new techniques of subversion may well call for a long-range revision of the statutory and
constitutional rules which prescribe the legitimate conditions of party competition in mod-
ern democracies. ... " Ibid., at 682, 687.
Riesman, op. cit. supra note 52, at 60-61.
See supra, note 68. This disposes of the argument that the suppression of the totalitarians
will give them moral justification for using illegal means which they would otherwise lack,
because their objective is to crush, not support, democracy.
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resort to the violent seizure of power in a democratic state, even if intended
to accomplish limited ends and not to destroy the democratic framework it-
self, is pernicious because the use of violence is "peculiarly calculated to cre-
ate habits of despotism which would survive the crisis by which they were
generated.18 4 Therefore, because I agree with the legislative and judicial find-
ings that the totalitarian Communist movement is committed to the use of
force and violence, this fact alone, in my opinion, should support the congres-
sional decision to outlaw the Communist Party. Nevertheless, there is reason
to question the Supreme Court's finding that the conspiracy in the Dennis
case created a clear and present danger of an attempt to overthrow the gov-
ernment by force and violence. We may agree, as I do, with Judge Learned
Hand's determination that the gravity of the evil in the Dennis case (an
attempt at overthrow), discounted by its improbability, was greater than the
mischief of the repression. But we must agree with Mr. Justice Frankfurter
that "[iun all fairness, the argument [that "there is a constitutional principle
• . . prohibiting restriction upon utterance unless it creates a situation of
'imminent' peril against which legislation may guard"] cannot be met by re-
interpreting the Court's frequent use of 'clear' and 'present' to mean an en-
tertainable 'probability.' "85 Yet it is precisely this reinterpretation which has
given rise to the fear that there are no longer any principles safeguarding free-
dom of speech.
Implications for the Clear and Present Danger Rule of Rejection of Ortho-
dox Democratic Theory. If we accept the implications of the theory of democ-
racy presented in this paper, the clear and present danger rule, whether as
stated by Holmes,8 6 Brandeis, 87 or Learned Hand,8 8 will lose its significance
" Russell, The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism 92-93 (2d ed., 1949). Our constitu-
tional tradition supports this view, since the taking up of arms would undoubtedly consti-
tute the crime of treason by levying war. See The Trial of Thomas Wilson Dorr, 2 American
State Trials 5 (Lawson ed., 1914) (R.I. Sup. Ct., 1844) and The Trial of John Brown, 6
American State Trials 700 (Lawson ed., 1916) (Jefferson City C.C. Va., 1859), cited in
Hurst, op. cit. supra note 56, at 849.
*341 U.S. 494, 527 (1951).
"The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and
degree." Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
8' "To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of free and fearless
reasoning applied through the processes of popular government, no danger flowing from
speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so
imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time
to expose through discussion the falsehoods and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes
of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence." Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927).
' "In each case they [the courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted
by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the dan-
ger." United States v. Dennis, 183 F. 2d 201, 212 (C.A. 2d, 1950).
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in determining the constitutional limits upon the power of federal and state
governments to exclude totalitarian movements from the arena of party strug-
gle in a democracy. Some may still argue, however, that even if these implica-
tions are accepted, the First Amendment should be read as requiring that a
totalitarian party be permitted to engage in the constitutional competition for
political power until there is a "clear and present danger" that it may be
victorious. All the objections that may be advanced against the clear and
present danger rule as the test of constitutionality of legislation aimed at the
use of force and violence as a means of political change also apply against
the rule as the test of legislation aimed at totalitarian movements whether or
not they are committed to the use of illegal means. In addition, it seems even
more impossible to determine when there is a "clear and present danger" of a
legal victory by a totalitarian party than of an attempt to overthrow the gov-
ernment by force and violence. The idealist and pragmatist assumptions at the
basis of the views of the exponents of the clear and present danger rule en-
able them to avoid these difficulties, as becomes apparent when they attempt
to meet the objection that this test 89 imposes the risk that it restrains action
until it may be too late to prevent a totalitarian victory. "Our faith," says
Mr. Justice Douglas, "should be that our people will never give support to
these advocates of revolution, so long as we remain loyal to the purposes for
which our nation was founded."90 The pragmatist overtones of this expression
of idealist faith are clear in Professor Nathanson's criticism of the Dennis
case. "We expose our government," he writes, "to the apparent risk of suc-
cessful revolution because we are confident that no government which is worth
preserving can be seriously endangered by advocacy of the propriety or ne-
cessity of its violent overthrow .... [This] is a prophecy based essentially on
faith in the democratic process."9 1 Accordingly, even the success of the revo-
lution should not be too disturbing because it would merely mean that the de-
mocracy overthrown, e.g., the Weimar Republic, Kerensky government or
Czechoslovakian democracy, was not "worth preserving." But we value the
democratic process, as has been pointed out, not because we assume that the
policies of a democratic government are always the best or wisest or most just,
but because it keeps open the path of non-violent change. And it is quite
wrong, as Professor Popper warns, "to blame democracy for the political short-
' "When conditions are so critical that there will be no time to avoid the evil that the
speech threatens, it is time to call a halt." Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 585 (1951).
-0341 U.S. 494, 591 (1951). "I happen to believe," said Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in
Carlson v. Landon, "that our free way of life enlists such respect and love that our nation
cannot be imperiled by mere talk." 342 U.S. 524, 555-56 (1952). See, too, Nathanson, The
Communist Trial and the Clear and Present Danger Test, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1167, 1174
(1950).
' Nathanson, op. cit. supra note 90, at 1175.
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comings of a democratic state. We should rather blame ourselves, that is to
say, the citizens of the democratic state," because democracy only makes pos-
sible "the use of reason in the designing of new institutions and the adjusting
of old ones. It cannot provide reason." 92
It seems to me, too, that the current defenders of the clear and present
danger rule, as stated particularly by Mr. Justice Brandeis, show an insuffi-
cient understanding of the nature and roots of modern totalitarianism. What
Professor Wechsler said in criticism of legislation directed at the advocacy of
violent overthrow of government can be said appropriately of the clear and
present danger rule. "It represents an uncritical acceptance of a formula de-
vised during the days when the Communist manifesto represented the tech-
nique of revolution; when revolutionaries operated by declaring rather than
disguising their principles; when revolutionaries accepted rather than re-
jected the rule of reason; when they played upon the aspirations of men rather
than upon their prejudices."98 It is not necessary to assume that the Ameri-
can people, too, have become apathetic and possessed of the psychological
need to "escape from freedom" 94 and that mass propaganda, using the new
facilities of mass communication, will lead them to succumb to the irrational
appeal of totalitarianism, in order to agree with Riesman that "events have
not shown that speech and writing, even those which begin as 'puny anonym-
ities,' are incapable of promoting revolution," 95 and that the "job of wise
statesmanship would seem to be to eliminate unnecessary gambles in the
realm of public policy." 96 In any event, whether Mr. Justice Douglas' faith
that "it can't happen here" is accepted as the basis of public policy at any
particular time, it is difficult to see why such faith should become the basis
of a constitutional doctrine limiting a democratic government's power to
deal with totalitarian movements. Apart from the position that the question
will never arise, it is inconsistent in principle, to say that the claim of a totali-
'I Popper, op. cit. supra note 51, at 126-27.
Wechsler, Symposium on Civil Liberties, 9 Am. L. School Rev. 881, 888-89 (1941). "It
does not follow," judge Hand has said, that Brandeis would have been of the same opinion
"if the conspirators had sought to mask their purposes by fair words, as they did in the
case at bar." 183 F. 2d 201, 208 (CA. 2d, 1950). The cases in which the "clear and present
danger" test was elaborated all arose, as Mr. justice Jackson has pointed out, "before the
era of World War II revealed the subtlety and efficacy of modernized revolutionary tech-
niques used by totalitarian parties." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 567 (1951).
Consult, also, Russell, The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism 95 (2d ed., 1949).
Consult Fromm, Escape from Freedom (1941).
Riesman, op. cit. supra note 52, at 39. The term "puny anonymities" was used by Mr.
justice Holmes in his dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 629
(1919).
"Riesman, op. cit. supra note 52, at 40. "[In government, as in medicine or law," Ries-
man continues, "progress in the art is measured by the extent to which preventive measures
are adopted before the point is reached at which only curative remedies are left." Ibid.
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tarian movement to engage in the political struggle by legal means should be
secured by the Constitution but that this protection should be withdrawn if the
totalitarians approach victory by these means.
judge Learned Hand interpreted the clear and present danger rule as in-
volving "in every case a comparison between interests which are to be ap-
praised qualitatively." 97 In each case, he wrote, the courts "must ask whether
the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such inva-
sion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."98 The interests he
saw in conflict are those sought to be secured by free speech and the social
interest in the general security sought to be protected by thwarting attempts
to overthrow the government by force or violence. But so long as any test of
constitutionality leaves it to the courts to estimate the gravity and probability
of the evil-the attempt at forceful overthrow-it remains open to the criti-
cism which Mr. Justice Frankfurter levelled against the view that "clear and
present" means "imminent." "To make validity of legislation depend on judi-
cial reading of events still in the womb of time-a forecast, that is, of the
outcome of forces at best appreciated only with knowledge of the topmost
secrets of nations-is to charge the judiciary with duties beyond its equip-
ment." 99 Judge Hand, it seems to me, would not deny the validity of this
criticism, but would reply that the courts in the Dennis case at any rate had
no choice but to make the forecast since the Smith Act made the courts the
"surrogate" of Congress to do so.' ° ° To avoid the difficulty in Judge Hand's
position, Mr. Justice Frankfurter calls essentially for a "candid and in-
formed weighing of the competing interests"'1 1 without use of the clear and
present danger formula. Thereby he makes explicit the legislative nature of
the task which the courts have always had to perform in applying the clear
and present danger rule. Recognition of this fact made it necessary for him
to acknowledge that the legislature had the "primary responsibility" 0 2 to
choose between competing interests and the courts must respect the legisla-
tive choice "unless outside the pale of fair judgment."' 0 3
Mr. Justice Frankfurter analyzed the conflicting interests as did Judge Hand
and justified judicial deference to the legislative judgment solely because it
was the judgment of the people's "representatives."' 1 4 On both these points,
183 F. 2d 201, 212 (CA. 2d, 1950).
TIbid.
Concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Dennis case, 341 U.S. 494, 551
(1951). Mr. justice Jackson made the same point at 570.
10 183 F. 2d 201, 216 (CA. 2d, 1950).
'341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951).
10 Ibid.
'
0 Ibid., at 540. ' Ibid., at 552.
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it is submitted with respect, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's analysis does not go
far enough and has been subjected to justifiable criticism.10 5 Majority rule,
as has been argued, does not exhaust the content of our constitutional democ-
racy.10 6 "The framers were not unaware," Mr. Chief Justice Stone has said,
"that under the system which they created most governmental curtailments
of personal liberty would have the support of a legislative judgment that the
public interest would be better served by its curtailment than by its consti-
tutional protection."10 7 It is not "undemocratic" for the Court to resist the
will of the majority in order to uphold the principle of freedom. But it is not
inconsistent with this view to urge that the attitude of the Court toward
anti-totalitarian legislation be similar to that which it takes toward legisla-
tion regulating economic affairs. Economic regulation, no less than anti-totali-
tarian legislation, involves the "paradox of freedom." It, too, limits the free-
dom of those subjected to it, but it may be upheld as constitutional not simply
because of the deference due to the will of the majority, but in order to ef-
fectuate the principle of freedom; not because some interests other than
those sought to be secured by freedom are considered more important by the
legislature, but because economic regulation itself secures and expands the
area of freedom. In other words, we have come to recognize that freedom
means more than the absence of legal restraint and may require the removal
of other restraints, like economic insecurity, which inhibit the individual per-
sonality. To enlarge the freedom of the economically weak, we see the neces-
sity of limiting the freedom of the economically strong.'08 Similarly, it is not
interests other than those sought to be secured by freedom of speech which may
be protected by anti-totalitarian legislation like the Communist Control Act,
but these very interests themselves. Concern for the national security in this
case may not be concern for any existing institutions other than those which
make possible non-violent change in a democratic framework. The principle of
freedom, itself, therefore, requires that the Supreme Court uphold the judg-
ment of Congress that totalitarian political organizations be proscribed.
"' Rostow, op. cit. supra note 39 (passim).
' In his first speech in the Virginia ratifying convention, Madison warned that in re-
publics, the turbulence, violence and abuse of power of majorities have more frequently
than any other cause produced despotism. 3 Elliott, The Debates in the Several State Con-
ventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 87 (2d ed., 1845), cited in Hurst,
op. cit. supra note 56, at 406 n. 97. Although Jefferson regarded "absolute acquiescence in
the decisions of the majority as the 'vital principle of republics,' " he also invoked the
"sacred principle" that the will of the majority "to be rightful must be reasonable; that the
minority possess their equal rights, which equal law must protect and to violate would be
oppression." First Inaugural in 1801, Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United
States, H.R. Doc. No. 540, 82d Cong. 2d Sess. 11-12 (1952). This strain runs through
American thought otherwise as diverse as Calhoun, Lincoln, Thoreau and Emerson.
'o Dissenting opinion in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 604-5 (1940).
'm Consult II Popper, op. cit. supra note 51, at 125.
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However, this same principle of freedom, read into the First Amendment,
requires that the Court review the congressional finding that a particular
political organization sought to be proscribed is totalitarian in fact. Clearly,
the findings in Section 2 of the Communist Control Act are not conclusive
upon the courts. 10 9 The important question is the scope of judicial review.
In the Dennis case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter suggested that the Court ask
whether the congressional determinations have "the warrant of substantial
proof.' 110 I would urge, however, that the Court go at least as far as Section
14 of the Internal Security Act and invalidate Section 3 of the Communist
Control Act if it concludes that the findings in Section 2 are not supported
by the preponderance of the evidence presented to it. This comes very close
'United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) ; Bryant v. Zimmerman,
278 U.S. 63 (1928) (reviewing findings about the Ku Klux Klan). See Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951), after remand, 104 F. Supp. 567
(D.D.C., 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 911 (1953).
'o Concurring opinion in the Dennis case, 341 U.S. 494, 526 (1951). It does not help to
determine the standard of review to talk about the "presumption" of constitutionality or
unconstitutionality. Judge Learned Hand has held the "presumption of constitutionality"
to be applicable not only when the courts are reviewing a legislative "choice of values," but
also when the courts have "undertaken an inquiry as to the facts on which the validity of
a statute turns." Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Ten Eyck, 11 F. Supp. 599, 600 (S.D.
N.Y., 1935) on remand after Borden's Farm Products v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194 (1934), in
which Mr. Chief Justice Hughes stated (293 U.S. 194, 209) that the presumption of con-
stitutionality was a "presumption ... of the existence of factual conditions supporting the
legislation." To Judge Hand this meant that a court was to hold a law invalid not if "it
finds to its own satisfaction that the necessary facts do not exist," but only if it finds that
"reasonable people could not believe that they did. . . ." 11 F. Supp. 599, 600 (S.D.N.Y.,
1935). He then compared the function of the court in reviewing legislative findings to its
function in reviewing a jury verdict or the findings of an administrative tribunal. This test
of course comes very close to the test of the "warrant of substantial proof." Judging by his
review of the legislative findings in the Carolene Products Co. case, it does not seem that
Mr. Chief Justice Stone envisaged a lesser function for the judiciary when he suggested that
the test of unconstitutionality was whether the legislation was "of such a character as to
preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and
experience of the legislators." United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
(1938). See, too, Freund, On Understanding the Supreme Court 88 (1945).
In the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee case, Mr. Justice Burton, speaking for the
Court, did not indicate what the scope of judicial review would be, but merely said:
"Whether the complaining organizations are in fact Communistic or whether the Attorney-
General possesses information from which he could reasonably find them to be so must
await determination by the District Court upon remand." 341 U.S. 123, 141 (1951). On
remand, the district court thought evidence should be received concerning the factual mat-
ters upon which the Attorney-General based his action in order "to determine whether, in
the light of such evidence, there was a reasonable basis for his reaching the conclusion which
he did." 104 F. Supp. 567, 571 (D.D.C., 1952).
Section 14(a) of the Internal Security Act provides that the findings of the Subversive
Activities Control Board as to the facts "if supported by the preponderance of the evi-
dence, shall be conclusive." 64 Stat. 1001 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. § 793 (1951). Judge Prettyman
thought this was "a less stringent restriction upon the function of judicial review than is
customary in such statutes" and imposed "a laborious task upon the reviewing court." CP
v. SACB, 223 F. 2d 531, 562 (App. D.C., 1954).
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to saying, as I would prefer to do, that the Court should hold the Section
invalid if it "finds to its own satisfaction""' that the Communist Party is
not a totalitarian organization. To the extent that deference to the principle
of majority rule may make the courts reluctant to go this far, what has al-
ready been said on this question should, it is submitted, dispel the reluctance.
Furthermore, the courts are as able as Congress or an administrative tribunal
to evaluate the theoretical, historical and empirical data involved in de-
termining whether a particular political organization is totalitarian. In fact,
the Section 2 findings are in large measure based upon judicial assessments
of the Communist movement.
The Treason Clause. Professor Hurst has argued persuasively that the his-
tory of the treason clause"12 suggests it "was in fact understood to guarantee
non-violent political controversy against suppression under the charge of
treason or any other criminal charge based on its supposed subversive char-
acter" and that this guarantee, therefore, should make up the specific, mini-
mum content of the First Amendment as well.113 Although the courts have not
drawn this implication from the treason clause"1 4 and the point has not been
discussed in any of the recent cases involving anti-subversive legislation, it
merits serious consideration in any re-evaluation of the free speech problem.
But like most arguments based upon constitutional history which emphasize
"what seemed wise and practical to the men who created this governmeft," 1" 5
it cannot provide automatic solutions for new problems confronting a new
generation.
It is not a profitable task to attempt to decide, by historical analogy,
whether the founding fathers, if they were alive today, would permit a totali-
tarian political organization to compete for power even by peaceful means.
As I read and re-read the historical evidence adduced by Hurst, no overwhelm-
ing inference emerges. Emphasizing the political liberalism of the founding
fathers, we may draw one inference; emphasizing their hatred of tyranny, an
opposite one. There is evidence that in drafting the treason clause, the found-
ing fathers were anxious to protect the kind of activities in which they them-
selves had engaged during the pre-revolutionary struggle against Great
Britain. They were certain these activities consisted of political opposition and
"'Judge Learned Hand in Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Ten Eyck, 11 F. Supp. 599
(S.D. N.Y., 1935).
=" U.S. Const. Art. III, S 3: "Treason against the United States, shall consist only in
levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.
No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the
same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court."
"'Hurst, op. cit. supra note 56, at 416-44. The quotation is at 442.
"'See Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 210 (1919) ; Schaefer v. United States,
251 U.S. 466 (1920) ; Hurst, op. cit. supra note 56, at 439-42.
"' Hurst, op. cit. supra note 56, at 444.
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resistance to tyrannical government. In 1792, Jefferson, for example, wrote
that "Treason,... when real, merits the highest punishment. But most codes
extend their definitions of treason to acts not really against one's country.
They do not distinguish between acts against the government, and acts
against the oppressions. of the government; the latter are virtues; yet they
have furnished more victims to the executioner than the former; real treasons
are rare; oppressions frequent. The unsuccessful strugglers against tyranny
have been the chief martyrs of treason laws in all countries." 116 There is no
evidence that when the founding fathers expressed concern about the abuses
which the treason laws made possible, they intended to protect a political op-
position which, if successful, would put an end to the political processes of a
free government. There is evidence, however, that they intended to protect
rival political groups operating within the framework of a free government
from using treason accusations and prosecutions as political weapons against
each other.117 Significantly, Hurst concludes that the provisions of Article IV,
Section 4118 of the Constitution were changed during the process of delibera-
tion "in order to exclude interference thereunder with the peaceful political
processes, subject perhaps to one limitation-if it is such-that even by peace-
ful means no state might adopt a monarchical or other fundamentally non-
republican form of government" and that this history "suggests the scope
of the policy probably represented also by the stringent limitations of the
closely related treason section." 11 9 There is nothing inconsistent, in my opin-
ion, between this position and the views put forth in this paper. I would agree
that "the historic scope of the treason clause" is "evidence of the constitu-
tional policy in favor of free expression and advocacy of ideas and beliefs,"
including the idea and belief that a "monarchical or other fundamentally non-
republican form of government" should be adopted. This, I think, was funda-
mentally Jefferson's view in the oft-quoted passage from his First Inaugural
in 1801.120 But by proscribing the Communist Party, Congress is not aiming
' 8 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 332 (Library ed., 1903), quoted by Hurst, op. cit.
supra note 56, at 250 n. 39. Hurst recounts that Jefferson, as Secretary of State, was writing
to Messrs. Carmichael and Short, regarding negotiations with Spain and explaining why
this country would not wish to agree to surrender political refugees.
"7 For example, Madison wrote in No. 43 of the Federalist: "[N]ewfangled and artificial
treasons have been the great engines by which violent factions, the natural offspring of free
government, have usually wreaked their alternate malignity on each other." Quoted by
Hurst, op. cit. supra note 56, at 414.
"The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form
of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion, and on Application of the
Legislature, or of the Executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic
Violence."
I' Hurst, op. cit. supra note 56, at 435.
' See note 47 supra. Compare Jefferson's views on the Burr conspiracy as related in 3
Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall 274-545 (1919).
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at "ideas and beliefs" or "utterances" but at an organized movement seeking
political power to crush democracy. By launching a totalitarian movement,
its leaders and "knowing" members demonstrate that they have "moved from
the realm of thought, plan, ideas, or opinions into the world of action. 1 12 '
Their "specific intent" is thereby revealed and the overt act committed
against which a democracy may seek to protect itself.
B. BILL OF ATTAINDER AND DUE PROCESS CLAUSES
Accepting the view that the right to vote is meaningless without the right
to organize and work in political parties which alone can make the vote effec-
tive, it may be argued that the proscription of the Communist Party either
accomplishes "the disfranchisement of voters" or else compels them, "if they
vote at all, to vote for representatives of political parties other than that to
which they belong," in which case the "deprivation of the right of selection
is a deprivation of the right of franchise."'1 22 But not every "deprivation of
the right of selection" is unconstitutional. Most states impose requirements of
various sorts which a party must meet to be eligible to appear on the ballot.
1 23
It has been the major burden of this paper to show that it is consistent with
democratic principle to regard totalitarian parties as ineligible and to deprive
individuals of the opportunity to vote for them. Nevertheless, the specificity
of Section 3 of the Communist Control Act raises other constitutional ques-
tions-is it an act in the nature of a bill of attainder prohibited by Article I,
Section 9 of the Constitution; does it otherwise violate due process?
Before considering these questions, it should be noted that Section 3 also
proscribes "any successors of the Communist party, regardless of the assumed
name, whose object or purpose is to overthrow" any government in the United
States by force and violence. The constitutional objections about to be dis-
cussed would not apply to this provision. In answer to the argument of the
Communist Party that the Internal Security Act "contains a pre-determina-
tion of its nature as a Communist-action organization-a built-in verdict
against it," the court of appeals said: "We find no such pre-determination.
Petitioner is not mentioned. Whether it does or does not fall within the de-
=
1Hurst, op. cit. supra note 56, at 830.
'Britton v. Board of Election Commissioners, 129 Cal. 337, 344, 61 Pac. 1115, 1117
(1900); Communist Party v. Peek, 20 Cal. 2d 536, 127 P. 2d 889 (1942). See, generally,
Starr, The Legal Status of American Political Parties, 34 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 439, 685 (1940).
Whether such a deprivation is an unconstitutional federal encroachment upon states' rights
will be considered subsequently. It may also be argued that the proscription of a party
abridges "the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances" in violation of the First Amendment. But all that has been said
about the applicability of the guarantee of freedom of speech would be pertinent in meeting
this argument.
'" Consult Limitations on Access to the General Election Ballot, 37 Col. L. Rev. 86
(1937).
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scription in the statute is a matter of evidence, just as it is in respect to every
other respondent to a petition before the Board. A statute is not necessarily
null merely because it fits a known person. Many valid statutes do.' 24 Clear-
ly, then, even if the bill of attainder or due process argument is sustained,
because the Party is proscribed by name, Congress will be able to achieve its
objective by a generally worded statute. Yet if we are to have anti-totalitarian
legislation, specificity safeguards civil liberties the more; general language
always opens possibilities of abuse.'25 It would seem, too, that the practice of
specifying the organization to be outlawed offers the greater protection to the
organization itself. Under a generally worded statute, the initial decision to
proceed against a particular organization is solely that of the executive. The
organization has no opportunity to protect itself against this initial step. Full-
scale discussion and debate in Congress about the propriety and wisdom of
proscribing a named political organization, subject as it always is to the pres-
sure of public opinion, affords the greater initial protection. But, of course,
under a generally worded statute the initial executive action is followed by a
trial or an administrative hearing and determination subject to judicial re-
view. The judiciary thereby plays the crucial role in protecting the rights of
the organization. But the courts should play no lesser role in connection with
the Communist Control Act, because, as has been argued, the First Amend-
ment should be read to require judicial review of the congressional finding
that the Communist Party is a totalitarian organization.
State legislation has raised many of these same questions. In Communist
Party v. Peek,' 6 the California court upheld a statute 2 7 denying a place on
the ballot in primary elections to any party which advocated the forceful
overthrow of government, on the ground that it was a reasonable exercise of
the power granted the legislature by the California constitution "to deter-
mine the tests and conditions upon which electors, political parties, or organ-
CP v. SACB, 223 F. 2d 531, 558 (App. D.C., 1954).
Professor Chafee gave an excellent example of this danger in a letter to the Senate
Judiciary Committee opposing the bills which eventually became the Internal Security Act.
39 Stat. 919 (1917), 18 U.S.C.A. S 871 (1950), punishes with imprisonment up to five years
a wilful "threat to take the life of the President. . . ." "What could be plainer?" wrote
Professor Chafee. "At once we think of the need of shutting up the man who writes the
President that he will be shot unless a certain bill is vetoed. But that is not the way this
statute has worked out. A man in Beaumont, Texas, got into a violent argument about
Wilson's war policies and exclaimed 'I wish Wilson was in hell, and if I had the power I
would put him there.' He was convicted under this law, and the appellate judges held his
revolting language was punishable as a threat to kill the President, because how could he
be in hell unless he were dead? (Clark v. United States, 250 Fed. 449 (C.A. 5th, 1918))."
Hearing before a Subcommittee on S. 1194 and S. 1196 of the Senate Committee on the
judiciary, 81st Cong. 1st Sess. 248 (1949).
20 Cal. 2d 536, 127 P. 2d 889 (1942).
Cal. Stat. (Deering, Supp., 1941) §2540.4.
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izations of electors may participate in any... primary election."'128 Parties
which were barred, said the court, "constitute an immediate threat to the
functioning of our institutions, including the continued exercise of the right of
suffrage," and "the finding of the Legislature that the problem requires re-
strictive legislation is conclusive on the courts."'12 9 But the California court
invalidated the statutory provisions barring any party "which uses or adopts
as any part of its party designation the word 'communist' or any derivative
of the word 'communist,' or "which is directly or indirectly affiliated, by
any means whatsoever, with the Communist Party of the United States, [or]
the Third Communist International.' 3 0 Unlike the Communist Control Act,
the California statute contained no findings of fact about the nature of the
Communist Party or the Third International, and the court refused to take
judicial notice that the Party advocated the overthrow of the United States
government by force and violence.' 31 The statutory provisions, therefore, in the
court's opinion, had no reasonable relation to the end sought to be achieved
by the legislature, because the "name adopted by a political party is fre-
quently without any value in ascertaining the political beliefs of its adherents,
and if the beliefs were pernicious, they would remain so despite a change in
the name of the party.' 32 To the argument that the statute contained an im-
plied finding that the Communist Party advocated the forceful overthrow of
' Cal. Const. Art. II § 22.
'20 Cal. 2d 536, 551, 549, 127 P. 2d 889, 898, 897 (1942). As of January 1, 1951, 15
states excluded from elections political groups advocating the overthrow of the government
by force and violence. Gellhorn, The States and Subversion 373 (1952). This type of legisla-
tion was also upheld in Field v. Hall, 201 Ark. 77, 143 S.W. 2d 567 (1940), in which case,
however, the court refused to accept the view that the prohibition of a political party in-
terfered with the right of suffrage.
'o Cal. Stat. (Deering, Supp., 1941) §§ 2540.3, 2540.4. Gellhorn lists 7 other states as
having similar legislation, op. cit. supra note 129, at Appendix A. The California court also
invalidated the portion of § 2540.4 which barred any party "which is directly or indirectly
affiliated, by any means whatsoever, with . . . any other foreign agency, political party,
organization or government. . . ." because this provision was "too sweeping," since the
purposes of such a foreign organization might be beneficial or far removed from the field of
political action in the United States. See, too, Feinglass v. Reinecke, 48 F. Supp. 438 (N.D.
Ill., 1942).
'The court took the same position in State ex rel. Huff v. Reeves, 5 Wash. 2d 637, 106 P.
2d 729 (1940) and issued a peremptory writ of mandamus requiring the secretary of state
to allow the Communist Party to appear on the ballot. Existing law required every political
party to file its declaration of principles as a condition precedent to appearing on the ballot.
The Party's declaration stated that its principles were "To keep America at peace, to win
economic security and prosperity for the people of the State of Washington and the Ameri-
can people; to protect and maintain the Bill of Rights and the civil liberties of the people."
The secretary of state charged that the statute had not been complied with because this
declaration was false. There was no other statutory basis for barring the Party from the
ballot.
-20 Cal. 2d 536, 546, 127 P. 2d 889, 895 (1942). See, too, Feinglass v. Reinecke, 48 F.
Supp. 438 (N.D. Ill., 1942).
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the government which was binding on the courts, the court replied that it was
a judicial, not a legislative function "to determine whether a Statute declaring
a general policy has been violated in a particular case" 133 and, besides, a
statute which purported to determine that a particular person or group vio-
lated a general law would be a "special" law prohibited by the California
constitution.13 4
The California court did not rely upon or even mention Article I, Sec-
tion 10, clause I of the Constitution which prohibits states from passing
bills of attainder. Moreover, state courts have generally upheld the "Test
Oath Acts" designed directly to bar from public office or voting any person
"who has ever voluntarily borne arms against the government of the United
States, or in any manner voluntarily aided or abetted in the attempted over-
throw of said government" on the ground that these laws did not inflict pun-
ishment for past actions but imposed reasonable qualifications for holding
public office or voting.135 More recently, the Supreme Court of Washington136
took a more restrictive view in considering whether a statutea 7 was a bill of
attainder because it required every candidate for office to accompany his
declaration of candidacy with an affidavit to the effect that he was not a sub-
versive person, as that term was defined in the statute. The court assumed that
if the statute were construed to require an oath covering past conduct, it
would be unconstitutional as a bill of attainder, but since it read the statute
"to require an oath of allegiance relating to the present and the future,"' 38
it upheld it. But clearly the Communist Control Act also relates to the "pres-
ent and the future" and not to the past. In any case, the federal courts have
not adopted the restrictive view of the Washington court.
20 Cal. 2d 536, 548, 127 P. 2d 889, 897 (1942).
' Cal. Const. Art. IV, § 25, 11.
Boyd v. Mills, 53 Kan. 594, 37 Pac. 16 (1894) (this case did not directly involve the
oath); Blair v. Ridgely, 41 Mo. 63 (1867); Anderson v. Baker, 23 Md. 531 (1865). In
Green v. Shumway, 39 N.Y. 418, 36 How. Pr. 5 (1868), it was held that a test oath act
violated the New York constitution which prescribed qualifications for electors, because the
legislature had no power to impose disabilities not existing at the time the constitution was
adopted. Only two judges thought the act a "bill of attainder," saying "There can be no
doubt... that to deprive a citizen of the privilege of exercising the elective franchise, for
any conduct of which he has previously been guilty, is to inflict punishment for the act
done." Ibid., at 421, 8. Cf. Shepherd v. Grimmett, 3 Idaho 403, 31 Pac. 793 (1892). It is as-
sumed that like the privilege against self-incrimination, only natural persons may raise the
objection that a statute is a bill of attainder. Cf. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
But the analysis presented herein would not be essentially different if it were held that the
Communist Party as such may interpose this objection. For the argument that the Party
as such may raise this question, see 64 Yale L. J., op. cit. supra note 3, at 724-25 n. 74.
1 Huntamer v. Coe, 40 Wash. 2d 767, 246 P. 2d 489 (1952).
'"Wash. L. (1951) c. 254, §§ 1(e), 16.
-40 Wash. 2d 767, 776, 246 P. 2d 489, 494 (1952).
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Mr. Justice Clark, speaking for the Court which upheld a Los Angeles
ordinance requiring every city employee to take a loyalty oath and execute
an affidavit that he was not and never had been a member of the Communist
Party, said: "Whether legislative action curtailing a privilege previously en-
joyed amounts to punishment depends upon 'the circumstances attending and
the causes of the deprivation. 139 We are unable to conclude that punishment
is imposed by a general regulation which merely provides standards of qual-
ification and eligibility for employment.' 40 He stressed the point that where-
as the subject matter of the required oaths in Cummings v. Missouri'41 and
Ex parte Garland1 42 was not relevant to the qualifications for the offices and
positions closed to the persons who refused to take the oath in those cases,
the requirements of the Los Angeles ordinance were relevant. The Court has
also affirmed a judgment denying a place on the ballot for a municipal elec-
tion in Baltimore, Maryland, to a candidate who refused to file the affidavit
required by the Ober Act to the effect that he was not engaged in one way
or another in the attempt to overthrow the government by force or violence
and was not knowingly a member of any organization engaged in such an at-
tempt.' 43 Similarly, in refusing to enjoin the enforcement of the Michigan
Trucks Act which provides that the name of any communist or any nominee
of the Communist Party shall not be printed upon ballots used in primary or
general elections in the state, a three-judge federal court rejected the conten-
tion that the act constituted a bill of attainder. 44 The plaintiffs, said the
court, "are subject to possible loss of opportunity to seek election to public
office only because there is substantial ground that their beliefs and loyalties
Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. (U.S.) 277, 320 (1866).
" Garner v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716, 722 (1951).
144 Wall. (U.S.) 277 (1866).
144 Wall. (U.S.) 333 (1866).
a" Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Election of Baltimore, 341 U.S. 56 (1951). As of
January 1, 1951, Alaska, Florida, Kansas, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon and Texas had
similar legislation. Gellhorn, op. cit. supra note 129, at 405. For the problems which such
oaths may raise under state law, compare the Gerende case and Shub v. Simpson, 196 Md.
177, 76 A. 2d 332 (1950) with Imbrie v. Marsh, 3 N.J. 578, 71 A. 2d 352 (1950). The ap-
peal in Shub v. Simpson was dismissed on the ground that the federal questions had become
moot, 340 U.S. 881 (1950), after the Court had denied a motion to advance and expedite
the hearing of the appeal, 340 U.S. 861 (1950), and a motion to reconsider its denial of the
motion to advance, 340 U.S. 873 (1950). The Court also denied a petition for certiorari to
review the holding of the Maryland court that the Ober Act could not apply to candidates
for Congress. Simpson v. Gerende, 340 U.S. 861 (1950).
'"Albertson v. Millard, 106 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Mich., 1952), vacated and remanded
with directions "to hold the proceedings in abeyance a reasonable time pending construction
of the statute by the state courts." 345 U.S. 242, 245 (1953). The provision referred to is
containedin § 7 of the Act. Mich. Stat. Ann. (Cum. Supp., 1953) §§ 28.243(11)-28.243(22).
As of January 1, 1951, Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, New Jersey
and Oklahoma had similar legislation. Gellhorn, op. cit supra note 129, at 405.
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will be transformed into future conduct. The history of past or present conduct
may be the foundation for judgment as to what that future conduct is likely
to be.' 14 5 The court also sustained the Trucks Act against attack based upon
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, taking judicial notice,
which the California court refused to do ten years earlier in Communist
Party v. Peek, that the Communist Party was "other than a political party,
in the usual and historical sense."'146
The Communist Control Act proceeds on the warranted assumption that
whether an organization is totalitarian is relevant to its qualification to con-
tinue to participate in the electoral struggle in a democracy. It does not,
therefore, exact "punishment" as retribution for any past acts' 47 of the Party
or its members, but disqualifies the Party for the future. Finally, if the
courts undertake to review the legislative findings characterizing the Com-
munist Party as a totalitarian organization, as has been proposed, it cannot
be maintained that the "punishment," even if such it be, inflicted by Section 3
of the Act, is imposed without the safeguards of a judicial trial.1 48
It has been argued that the Act is a bill of attainder because it has retro-
active effect within the meaning of the Douds rule since nothing the Party
can do or refrain from doing can take it out of the reach of the statute. 49 But
this is not so. To show that the non-communist affidavit requirement of the
Taft-Hartley Act was aimed at future and not past action, Mr. Chief justice
Vinson said: "members of those groups identified in § 9 (h) are free to serve
as union officers if at any time they renounce the allegiances which constituted
1" 106 F. Supp. 635, 644. Cf. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), in which the Court
upheld against attack based upon the First Amendment a statute of the Territory of Idaho
barring any person from registering or voting at an election who was "a member of any ...
organization... which teaches, advises, counsels or encourages its members, devotees or
any other person to commit the crime of bigamy or polygamy ... as a duty arising or re-
suiting from membership in such ... organization.... ." It sustained the conviction of an
individual for falsely swearing, in order to register, that he was not a member of such an
organization, merely upon a showing that he was a member of the Mormon church, though
not a bigamist or polygamist himself. The Court regarded belief in monogamy, which it
thought essential to the "founding of a free, self-governing commonwealth," citing Murphy
v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885), as a reasonable qualification for voting.
14 106 F. Supp. 635, 642. One judge dissented, arguing that the Act (1) denied due process
because the statutory definitions of "communist" and "Communist Party" were too vague
and (2) invaded the field pre-empted by the Internal Security Act.
IT Compare United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) and the Cummings and Garland
cases, supra, with the Garner and Douds cases, supra. Basically for the reason indicated in
the text, the contention that the Internal Security Act was a bill of attainder was rejected
in CP v. SACB, 223 F. 2d 531, 558 (App. D.C., 1954).
'United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946). The above analysis of the bill of
attainder problem will also apply to any attempt to use the Communist Control Act to
justify confiscation of the assets of the Communist Party. Cf. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623 (1887) and Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & W. Co., 251 U.S. 146 (1919).
20 64 Yale L. J., op. it. supra note 3, at 725-26 n. 81.
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a bar to signing the affidavit in the past ... there is no one who may not,
by a voluntary alteration of the loyalties which impel him to action, become
eligible to sign the affidavit."' °50 Similarly, the individuals who make up the
unincorporated association that is the Communist Party may voluntarily alter
their loyalties and organize a non-totalitarian political party which will not
be prohibited by the Act from participating in the electoral struggle. Section
3 obviously admits of this possibility because it proscribes only those succes-
sors of the Communist Party "whose object or purpose is to overthrow" gov-
ernment in the United States "by force and violence." 15' 1
The question remains whether Section 3 violates any other requirement of
due process. The fact that the Party will obtain a judicial hearing only after
and not before the initial act of proscription should not be held to violate due
process. 5 2 Even a holding that due process bars the listing by the Attorney-
General of an organization as "subversive" without prior notice and hearing,
would not govern the question under the Communist Control Act. The public
deliberations that accompany a proposal in Congress to outlaw an organiza-
tion are in marked contrast with the secrecy that surrounds a listing by the
Attorney-General. While, too, there seems to be no good reason why notice
and hearing should not precede administrative listing of an organization, as
is the case in New York,'53 there is good reason, as I have tried to show, why
a legislative proscription should be specific. Furthermore, it cannot be main-
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 414 (1950).
a A rather perverted argument is made in 55 Col. L. Rev., op. cit. supra note 3, at 727-28
that Section 3 is a bill of attainder within the meaning of the Douds doctrine because § 9(h)
of the Taft-Hartley Act permits Communist Party members to function as such without
restriction if they resign from union office, but there is no way under Section 3 in which
Party members, by withdrawing from non-Party pursuits, can engage in conventional party
activity. But the question under § 9(h) was whether the disqualification of Party members
from union office constituted a bill of attainder and this disqualification was itself in no
way ameliorated by the fact that Party members could resign from union office and continue
to function as Party members. Similarly the question under Section 3 is whether the dis-
qualification of the Communist Party from participation in the electoral process is a bill of
attainder and this disqualification cannot constitute a bill of attainder simply because
Party members may be willing to withdraw from all non-Party pursuits, even if that were
humanly possible. Whether the disqualification of Party members from union office and the
disqualification of the Party from participation in the electoral process are objectives which
Congress may constitutionally pursue are, of course, questions independent of the bill of
attainder question.
"joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951), on remand
104 F. Supp. 567 (D.D.C., 1952); Albertson v. Millard, 106 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Mich., 1952);
Field v. Hall, 201 Ark. 77, 143 S.W. 2d 567 (1940). In Kutcher v. Gray, 199 F. 2d 783 (App.
D.C., 1952), the court held that evidence of membership in a listed organization was com-
petent in a loyalty proceeding, even though the organization was listed without prior notice
or hearing. But see the concurring opinion of Mr. justice Frankfurter in the Refugee Com-
mittee case, to the effect that due process barred the listing of any organization without
prior notice and hearing. jstices Black, Douglas and Jackson agreed.
In Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
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tained reasonably that the Communist Party, in fact, has not received any
hearing prior to its proscription. The findings in Section 2 of the Act are
supported by numerous reports of different congressional committees issued
on the basis of investigations conducted over a period of many years 54 and
the haste and confusion which accompanied passage of the Act by no means
imply that Congress' characterization of the Communist Party is a product
of haste and confusion. Then, too, the courts have already reviewed and up-
held the essential findings about the Communist Party embodied in Section 2.
In the Douds and Dennis cases, Mr. Justice Jackson, relying on these congres-
sional reports and other data of which he took judicial notice, presented mas-
terly analyses of the aims and methods of the Communist Party. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter stated in the Dennis case that facts of common knowledge "would
amply justify a legislature in concluding that recruitment of additional mem-
bers for the Party would create a substantial danger to national security." 55
The Court has also reviewed and upheld the findings about the Communist
movement in the United States set forth in Section 2 (15) of the Internal
Security Act'16 in cases involving the deportation of aliens. In Carlson v.
Landon'57 it concluded that "the doctrines and practices of communism clear-
ly enough teach the use of force to achieve political control. . ".'."158 And, of
course, the findings of the Subversive Activities Control Board about the nature
of the Party were reviewed and upheld in CP v. SACB. Finally, if the disso-
lution of the Communist Party is an end which Congress may constitutionally
effectuate, as has been argued in this paper, any deprivation sought to be read
into the general language of Section 3-the right to sue, to hold property, or to
enter into contracts-is reasonably related to this end and meets the substan-
tive due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment.
C. THE BAsis OF FEDERAL AUTHORxTY FOR THE COMMUNIST CONTROL ACT
Up to this point, we have been considering the applicability of various
constitutional limitations upon congressional power, but what is the source of
the power to enact Section 3?
'For a listing of these reports, see the memorandum from the Legislative Reference
Service, 100 Cong. Rec. 13,992 (Aug. 16, 1954).
341 U.S. 494, 547.
1M64 Stat. 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. § 781(15) (1951).
342 U.S. 524 (1952).
2w Ibid., at 535. Arguing that the legislative findings in the Internal Security Act could not
reasonably be interpreted as a legislative declaration that all alien Communists were to be
refused bail, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in this case, said: "The immigration au-
thorities were by the Act relieved of proving-in order to make a prima fade case-that
the Communist Party is an 'organization ... that believes in, advises, advocates, or teaches
... the overthrow by force or violence of the Government.' But in the circumstances of
today a legislative definition of the Communist Party as an organization advocating violent
overthrow of government made little difference in the required proof." Ibid., at 565.
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Article I, Section 4, paragraph 1159 of the Constitution together with the
"necessary and proper" clause' 60 are the sources of Congress' authority to
exclude the Communist Party from the ballot in primary and general elec-
tions for Senators and Representatives. If Congress is not regulating the
"Manner of holding Elections" when it prescribes the parties which may ap-
pear on the ballot, neither are the states when they do the prescribing. 161 Yet
the states have closely regulated the participation of political parties in elec-
tions and Article I, Section 4, paragraph 1 has often been suggested as the
basis for federal action to alter or abolish the severe limitations which many
states have imposed on access to the ballot.1 62 Section 3 may also be upheld
as a measure to protect the integrity of federal elections and the basic right
of all citizens to vote in federal elections which would be jeopardized in a
totalitarian state.
163
It has been suggested, however, 6 4 that Section 3 may be subject to attack
because it attempts to impose additional qualifications upon candidates for
Congress in violation of Article I, Section 2, paragraph 2165 and Article I,
Section 3, paragraph 3.166 But this attack can hardly be successful so long as
"The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,
shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any
time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators."
'® U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, 18. "The Congress shall have Power... To make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in
any Department or Officer thereof."
""For the election of Senators and Representatives in Congress is a Federal function;
whatever the states do in the matter they do under authority derived from the Constitution
of the United States. The reservation contained in the Tenth Amendment cannot properly
operate upon this subject in favor of the state governments; they could not reserve power
over a matter that had no previous existence; hence if the power was not delegated to the
United States it must be deemed to have been reserved to the people, and would require a
constitutional amendment to bring it into play-a deplorable result of strict construction."
Mr. Justice Pitney, concurring in part in Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 281
(1921).
"See, for example, Limitation on Access to the General Election Ballot, 37 Col. L. Rev.
86 (1937).
1e Cf. United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.
299 (1941); United States v. Moseley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915) ; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S.
651 (1884); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880).
16 64 Yale L. J., op. cit. supra note 3, at 740-41.
" "No person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty-
five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when
elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen."
Ie "No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years,
and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an
Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen." Legally, the question may be put
more sharply in terms of whether Section 3 interferes with the prerogatives given each
House by Article I, Section 5, to be "the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications
of its own Members.... ." Cf. Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906).
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Section 3 is confined to barring from the ballot only the Communist Party it-
self and those candidates, as in Salwen v. Rees, who insist upon carrying the
Party label.167 Under these circumstances, it is the Party, not the individual
candidate, against which the exclusion is aimed. Since political parties came
into being only after the Constitution was adopted and their regulation has
been a function of government since early times, it cannot be maintained that
the regulatory principle embodied in Section 3 imposes an additional qualifi-
cation for individual candidates within the meaning of the term "qualifica-
tions" as used in Article I, Section 5. But should Section 3 be interpreted
also to bar from the ballot Communist Party members and avowed Party ad-
herents, even though they are prepared to discard the Party label, a construc-
tion which is rather unlikely in view of the Section's language, a serious con-
stitutional question would arise. 68 Even then it may be argued reasonably
that Section 3 merely implements Article VI, paragraph 3 which requires that
senators and representatives "be bound by Oath or Affirmation to support"
the Constitution. 169 Since its earliest days, Congress has passed legislation
implementing the oath requirement of Article VI. In his successful efforts to
get Congress to uphold the Test Oath Acts, Charles Sumner argued that the
constitutional oath requirement in effect imposed the fourth and most im-
portant constitutional qualification for congressional office-loyalty.170
To bar the Communist Party from the ballot in elections for presidential
electors and in state and local elections presents no greater difficulties. Al-
though the Supreme Court has held that under Article II, Section 1,171 "the
appointment and mode of appointment of electors belong exclusively to the
States,"'172 it has rejected the view that congressional authority is limited to
1"7 55 Col. L. Rev., op. cit. supra note 3, at 708, agrees with this conclusion.
1" See Shub v. Simpson, 196 Md. 177, 76 A. 2d 332 (1950) ; cf. Imbrie v. Marsh, 3 N.J.
578, 71 A. 2d 352 (1950).
Cf. Huntamer v. Coe, 40 Wash. 767, 246 P. 2d 489 (1952). The Washington court
construed the Washington statute to apply to candidates for Congress, saying: "The time
for taking such an oath is merely advanced.., to the time a candidate files and declares
his candidacy and the oath is required of al candidates-those ultimately successful, as well
as those ultimately unsuccessful." Ibid., at 777, 495.
170 See, for example, I Hinds, Precedents of the H. of R. §§ 448, 449 and 451 (1907).
1 Paragraph 2 of Section 1: "Each state shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors.. . ." Paragraph 3 of Section 1: "The Congress
may determine the Time of chusing the Electors...."
' McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892). See, too, Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall.
(U.S.) 162 (1875); Walker v. United States, 93 F. 2d 383 (C.A. 8th, 1937), cert. denied,
303 U.S. 655 (1938), in which the court affirmed a judgment of guilty in an indictment
arising out of the Kansas City election frauds which charged defendants with conspiring in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241 to injure and oppress citizens in their right to vote for presi-
dential electors and to have their votes counted as cast. Although the court acknowledged
that the right to vote for presidential electors depended "directly and exclusively on state
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determining the time of -choosing the, electors and recognized congressional
-power to safeguard the elections of presidential electors. 173 Congress possesses
this-power, said the Court, "as it possesses every* other power essential to
preserve the departments and institutions of the general government from im-
-pairment.or destruction, whether threatened by force or by corruption."'174:
This same "power of self-preservation" may also be invoked to bar the Com-
munist Party from participating in state and local elections. While the Com-
munist Control Act does not recite the powers which it undertakes to exer-
cise,175 the findings make it clear that its purpose is to protect "the security of
the United States." The national defense power, coupled with the inherent right
of self-preservation, has been held to support the Smith and Internal Security
Acts.Although the Smith Act was passed before war-broke out and contains
no recital of the powers:which it exercises, it is apparent from the Dennis
case, which did not go into this question in any: detail, that the Court found
congressional power in the "right of a government to maintain-its existence-
self-preservation. :. .,176 In Dunne v. United States,"77 the court of appeals
cited as authority for the Smith Act, the preamble to the Constitution,"' 8 the
defense powers,179 the inherent right of self-preservation and Article IV, Sec-
tion 4.180 Similarly, Section 2.(15) of the Internal Security Act declares its
purpos6 to be "to provide for the common defense, to preserve the sovereignty
of the United States as an independent nation and to guarantee to each state
a republican form of government." There is as much reason to uphold Sec-
legislation," it was careful to point out that the question before it was "not one of the
power of Congress to safeguard the elections of presidential electors but rather whether it
has done so by" 18 U.S.C. § 241. Ibid., at 388. Intimations of congressional power to safe-
guard the elections of presidential electors are also present in Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214
(1952).
' Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934). The Court viewed the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act, which it upheld, as seeking "to preserve the purity of presidential and vice-
presidential elections" and not in either purpose or in effect as interfering "with the power
of a state to appoint electors or the manner in which their appointment shall be made."
Ibid., at 544.
171 Ibid., at 545.
"
7
" "The question of the constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not depend"
on such recitals. Mr. justice Douglas speaking for the Court in Woods v. Miller, 333 U.S.
138, 144 (1948).
1 Concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 341 U.S. 494, 517.
" 138 F. 2d 137 (CA. 8th, 1943).
278 "[To] insure domestic Tranquility, [to] provide for the common defense ... and [to]
secure the Blessings of Liberty."
-Art. I, § 8, 1 (to "provide for the common Defence"), 12-16 and 18 (the necessary
and proper clause).
"o The "Republican Form of Government" clause. See note 118 supra.
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tion 3 of the Communist Control Act as an exercise of the defense power as
the Smith and Internal Security Acts.' 81
However, the source of constitutional authority most consistent with the
thesis presented in this paper is Article IV, Section 4, because Section 4's ob-
jective is to "guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government." But may Congress act without prior application by the state
legislature or executive for federal assistance? It was held in Commonwealth
v. Nelson, 82 on the authority of Hines v. Davidowitz,8 3 that the Smith Act
superseded the Pennsylvania Sedition Act'8 4 because "the duty of suppressing
sedition within a State rests directly upon the Federal Government by virtue
of Article IV, Section 4, of the Constitution."' 8 Even if it is thought that the
Nelson case goes too far because the language of Article IV, Section 4 in-
dicates that the suppression of "domestic violence" in a state is the state's
primary concern until it asks for federal aid, 88 Section 3 of the Communist
Control Act would not constitute an undue interference with states' rights.
For the language of Article IV, Section 4 does not condition either the federal
guarantee of a republican form of government (or the federal protection
against invasion) upon prior state application for federal assistance. And
properly so. It is conceivable that a totalitarian party could come to power
legally in a particular state, in which case, of course, the state would obviously
not ask for federal action against itself. Yet the duty of Congress to overthrow
such a government under Article IV, Section 4 would be unquestionable' 8 7
'But cf. Australian Communist Party v. Commonwealth, 83 Commw. L. R. 1 (1951),
in which the Communist Party Dissolution Act of 1950 was held not to be authorized by
the defense power in the Australian Constitution and therefore to be beyond the power of
the federal government. See Beasley, Australia's Communist Party Dissolution Act, 29 Can.
Bar Rev. 490 (1951). A constitutional amendment specifically authorizing the act was re-
jected in a popular referendum. Friedrich and Sutherland, op. cit. supra note 12, at 697.
377 Pa. 58, 104 A. 2d 133 (1954), cert. granted 348 U.S. 814 (1954). The court reversed
the conviction of a Communist Party leader for attempting to overthrow the government of
the United States by force and violence.
312 U.S. 52 (1941).
's' Originally enacted in 1919, re-enacted as Section 207 of Act of June 24, 1939, 18 Penn.
Stat. § 4207 (1945).
-377 Pa. 58, 69, 104 A. 2d 133, 139. Although the indictment charged only sedition
against the state, the court said that it was difficult to conceive of an act of sedition
against a state which would not at the same time be an act of sedition against the United
States and pointed out that the Smith Act was expressly directed against overthrow of the
government of any state as well as of the United States.
I Hunt, Federal Supremacy and State Anti-Subversive Legislation, 53 Mich. L. Rev. 407,
423 (1955).
Cf. the following statement by Mr. Chief justice Taney speaking for the Court in
Luther v. Borden, 7 How. (U.S.) 1, 45 (1849): "Unquestionably a military government,
established as the permanent government of the State, would not be a republican govern-
ment, and it would be the duty of Congress to overthrow it."
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If Section 3 is held to be an exercise of congressional authority to guarantee
to every state a republican form of government, will it then become immune
to any attack in the courts? In most of the cases in which the courts have re-
fused to review "political questions" under Article IV, Section 4, they have
been asked to enforce the guarantee by declaring an existing situation in a
particular state to be inconsistent with a republican form of government.188
They have refused to do so for a variety of reasons-their inability "to secure
the facts necessary for decision; the need for discretion in decision and the
courts' inability to develop or apply controlling principles of law; the superi-
ority of political checks as guides to decision; ... the inability of courts to
deal with the possible consequences of decision, such as would follow, for ex-
ample, a holding that an entire state government was unconstitutional .... ,89
These reasons have led the courts to place the responsibility for enforcing the
guarantee of a republican form of government upon Congress and the Execu-
tive. But this does not mean that every aspect of a congressional act neces-
sarily becomes immune from judicial review merely because it purports to en-
force the guarantee, and particularly when it raises questions of the violation
of other express constitutional provisions, like the First Amendment. Thus,
whether totalitarian organizations should be barred from the ballot in state
elections may be regarded as a "political question" not subject to judicial
review. But none of the reasons advanced for judicial self-limitation apply to
review of a congressional determination that a particular organization is to-
talitarian.1 0
' Luther v. Borden, 7 How. (U.S.) 1 (1849) ; Texas v. White, 7 Wail. (U.S.) 700 (1869);
Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. (U.S.) 162 (1875) ; Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (1900);
Pacific States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912); Kiernan v.
Portland, 223 U.S. 151 (1912); Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608 (1937).
1 Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 192 (1953).
'See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911), in which the Court, holding that Article IV,
Section 4 did not authorize Congress to impose restrictions upon the admission of a new
state into the Union which deprived it of equality with other states, invalidated an act of
Congress which specified where the state capitol should be located until 1913. And cf. Ohio
ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916), in which it was held that it was a non-
justiciable controversy whether an act of Congress permitting a state legislature to provide
for a referendum to apportion the state for the purpose of congressional elections was itself
repugnant to the guarantee of a republican form of government. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes,
speaking for the Court, said: "[Alt best the proposition comes to the assertion that because
Congress, upon whom the Constitution has conferred the exclusive authority to uphold the
guarantee of a republican form of government, has done something which it is deemed is
repugnant to that guarantee, therefore there was automatically created judicial authority
to go beyond the limits of judicial power and in doing so to usurp congressional power on
the ground that Congress had mistakenly dealt with a subject which was within its ex-
clusive control free from judicial interference." Ibid., at 570. But here too, the Court was
dealing with a situation in which it was asked to declare an existing form of government
to be non-republican in form in the face of a contrary determination by Congress. No such
conflict would be created by the scope of review herein suggested with regard to Section
3 of the Communist Control Act.
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III. THE WISDOM OF THE COMMUNIST CONTROL ACT
Most of the objections voiced against the Communist Control Act assume
that it-violates democratic principles in the interest of a short-sighted politi-
cal expediency. 191 However eloquently these criticisms may be expressed,
they are inapposite, as this paper has tried to show. The Act has also been at-
tacked because of its undisputed political motivation. With an election im-
pending, the liberal democrats who supported the original Humphrey pro-
posal were anxious to demonstrate to the country that they were not "soft"
on Communism and that the Democratic Party was not a "party of trea-
son."'192 The Republicans joined in lest the Democrats steal their anti-com-
munist thunder. Undoubtedly some legislators in both parties voted for the
Act to vent their spleen against "leftism" in general. But all this does not im-
ply that the Act itself is unwise. Those who condemn the argument that a
cause is evil simply because Communists also support it should not be quick
to criticize anti-Communist legislation simply because men of totalitarian
"rightist" mentality also favor it. Nor is it an argument against the Act that
it might persuade the people that the Republican and Democratic parties are
united and equally zealous in their anti-Communism. Whether it has had this
persuasive effect is, of course, debatable. Prominent Republican spokesmen
during the last election did not, because of it, cease their attacks upon the
Democratic Party as the "party of treason." Yet it may be the case that the
Act weakened the effectiveness of this attack. Democratic senators have
stated, informally, that the Act contributed to their electoral victories.
In short, the Communist Control Act does not represent an abandonment
of the liberal tradition. Men and women who call themselves liberals should
be in the forefront of the fight against Communism, just as they were in the
fight against Fascism. It was one of the tragedies of the 1930's that many
liberals were as blind to the implications of totalitarian Communism as many
conservatives were to those of totalitarian Fascism. There is no excuse for a
repetition of this dual folly. Only a united opposition to totalitarianism which
will take the issue out of the area of party conflict will hasten public under-
standing of the difference between all totalitarian movements, on the one hand,
Arguments for and against outlawry of the Communist Party are assembled in the
memorandum prepared by the Legislative Reference Service, 100 Cong. Rec. 14,613-22
(1954).
When he introduced his original proposal, Senator Humphrey said: "I am tired of
reading headlines about being 'soft' toward communism. I am tired of reading headlines
about being a leftist and others being leftists." 100 Cong. Rec. 14,210 (1954). When the
House threw out his provisions illegalizing membership in the Communist Party, Senator
Humphrey said: "I do not want to hear any more talk from anyone, after this attempt to
be so soft on communism, about a party of treason." 100 Cong. Rec. 14,578 (1954). It is
interesting to recall once again that it was one of the purposes of the treason clause to limit
the epithet value of the term "treason" in political combat. See supra note 117 and Hurst,
op. cit. supra note 56, at 424.
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and, on the other, those movements which, however radical their proposals for
changing the status quo, accept the framework of democracy. Renewed ap-
predation and enthusiasm for the American tradition of political dissent de-
pend upon this public understanding.
Yet it remains debatable whether the Act is the best way to combat the
Communist fifth column in this country and will do more good than harm
to the cause of democracy throughout the world. In making this difficult eval-
uation, the Act must be considered together with the Smith and Internal Se-
curity Acts. The three do not make up a wholly consistent program. The regis-
tration requirements of the Internal Security Act, as has been pointed out,
assume the continued legal existence of the Communist Party as an organi-
zation engaging in political and propaganda activities. But the purpose of the
Smith and Communist Control Acts seems to be to strip the Party of its
legality and force the dissolution of the overt Communist organization. This
latter objective (which, interestingly enough, was also that of the original
Humphrey proposal) may be accomplished by the Smith Act alone, if the
courts sustain the conviction of Communist Party members as members of a
"society, group or assembly of persons" who "teach, advocate, or encourage
the overthrow" of the government by force or violence, "knowing the pur-
poses thereof."193 The incongruity of the Smith Act prosecutions and per-
mitting the Communist Party to appear as a legal party on the ballot in na-
tional, state and local elections is apparent. But even without the Commu-
nist Control Act, it is unlikely that the Party will be eager to run candidates
for office, since Party nomination would single out the nominee for prose-
cution under the Smith Act.1 94
The question then resolves itself into whether the Communist Party should
be permitted to continue its open activities as an organization. No policy of
suppression, of course, can by itself put an end to its secret, conspiratorial
operations. 95 But suppression can drive the entire Communist apparatus
- 62 Stat. 808 (1948), 18 U.S.C.A. § 2385 (1951). It was under this provision that
Claude M. Lightfoot, executive secretary of the Communist Party of Illinois, was convicted
and sentenced to imprisonment for 5 years and a fine of $5,000. N.Y. Times p. 15, col. 6
(Feb. 16, 1955). The judgment of conviction was affirmed in United States v. Lightfoot, 228
F. 2d 861 (CA. 7th, 1956).
'The Communist Party appeared on the ballot in the presidential elections of 1924,
1928, 1932, 1936 and 1940. It polled the following votes in these elections, respectively:
36,386, 48,770, 102,991, 80,159 and 48,579. Statistical Abstract of the United States 343
(1954).
1 This distinction between the overt and covert activities of the Party is often not ap-
predated by those who charge that the Act will not be effective in any case. It is true that
Communist espionage and sabotage can be combatted successfully only by our own counter-
intelligence. But no reason is apparent why the Smith and Communist Control Acts could
not together succeed in destroying the Communist Party as an open organization. The
experience of the Weimar Republic with outlawing the Nazi Party is not very apt. As I read
Professor Loewenstein's summary of the German and other European experiences, I take
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underground and deprive the Party of the opportunities which open activi-
ties afford to recruit adherents, disseminate propaganda and cloak its conspi-
ratorial activities. This may result in spurring the Party to infiltrate other
parties and organizations. Without the Party's open activities, which enable
others to read Party literature, identify Party leaders, and attend Party
meetings, it will be more difficult to recognize the "Party line" and thereby
to expose infiltration. Suppression, too, will encourage the formation of a
larger, hard core of Communist fanatics, whereas open activities may lead
Party members into paths which induce defection and it may serve us well
in the ideological struggle with world Communism to adopt the missionary
attitude that every Communist soul is worth saving. 196
Resort to suppression also increases tension and excitement at home at a
time when it is of the utmost importance to be calm and helps to give the
rest of the world a picture of a frightened America, unsure of its strength
and uncertain of its purpose. While the picture which even our allies have
of us is, undoubtedly, greatly distorted, the government's policy towards all
phases of the security problem makes it easier for others to accept the dis-
torted picture as a reflection of reality. Insofar, too, as the orthodox con-
ception of democracy prevails at home and abroad, we appear to be hypo-
critical when we espouse the cause of free elections the world over, yet bar
the Communist Party from participating in elections at home. Although this
judgment of our policy, in my opinion, is based upon erroneous assumptions,
it is a fact of which we must take account.
On balance, therefore, it seems to me that both the Smith and Communist
Control Acts are unwise because the open activities of the Communist Party
do not intensify the danger presented by the world Communist movement
so much as to warrant sacrificing the positive gains which can be won by
the democratic cause if these open activities are tolerated. 197 Though a de-
mocracy should not wait until the danger becomes "clear and present," an
him to conclude that the anti-fascist and anti-communist legislation of the 1930's was ef-
fective whenever the determination existed to make it so. Loewenstein, Militant Democ-
racy and Fundamental Rights, 31 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 417, 638 (1937); Legislative Control
of Political Extremism in European Democracies, 38 Col. L. Rev. 591, 725 (1938). Studying
the European experience, Professor Riesman concluded that "[Ilt cannot be asserted...
that legislation is an entirely futile weapon, but rather that the difficulties are immense and
the social conditions of the time all but controlling." Op. cit. supra note 52, at 59. In the
United States today, the difficulties would be of a manageable proportion.
"According to recent press estimates, there are currently about 25,000 such souls.
In reaching this conclusion, I do not give any weight to the argument that suppression
of the Communist Party may sacrifice needed "criticism of defects in our society." (Mr.
justice Frankfurter in the Dennis case, 341 U.S. 494, 549.) We do not lack such criticism
from men and groups devoted to democracy. Communists, furthermore, distort and corrupt
every movement for reform of which they are a part. And reforms, it seems to me, should
be justified more on their own merits than on the ground they will help to fight Communism.
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evaluation of the nature of the danger and the gains to be won by toleration
is essential to a wise policy. Communism has suffered its greatest defeats
in the field of open political debate. Why should democracy desert a field of
battle in which it has been so successful?
But our problem is not yet answered. We are not faced with the original
question whether the Smith and Communist Control Acts should become law,
but whether they should now be repealed. And this question involves addi-
tional considerations. It would be a mistake to repeal these laws if the action
might be interpreted as a reversal by Congress of its estimate of the nature
of the Communist movement and threat. To rekindle the illusion that the
Communist Party is just like any other "radical" party is more to be feared,
in my opinion, than legislation depriving the Party of its legal existence.
Whether or not there is agreement on the policy conclusions reached in this
paper, there should be little dispute about the need for a non-partisan re-
examination of the issues. Calls for a high-level presidential commission to
do this job have come from many quarters. It is time they were heeded. 98
In conclusion, it is hoped that this paper will serve to emphasize the im-
portance of keeping separate and clear the issues of principle and policy in-
volved in meeting the totalitarian threat. Confusion of these issues does harm
to the cause of civil liberties. To hide a weak policy argument against the
suppression of the Communist Party behind talk of democratic principles
and the constitutional rights of Communists may produce popular contempt
for the principles and rights themselves. On the other hand, a strong argu-
ment against suppression becomes doubly persuasive if it is based upon ac-
ceptance of the view that no principle of democracy or the Constitution pro-
tects movements which seek political power only to destroy constitutional
democratic government.
'The creation of the Commission on Government Security goes a good part but not the
whole of the way. See Pub. L. No. 304, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug. 9, 1955), 69 Stat. 595.
For the membership of the twelve man Commission, see N.Y. Times p. 1, col. 5 (Nov. 1,
1955).
